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ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2239X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0115-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2239 
ITEM: ODOR/BACTERIA FILTER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-501 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-224OX 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0221-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2240 
ITEM: BAUAST VALVE SCREEN (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  1 1  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  I I 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA FM: DAMAGED ELEMENT/OPEN 
NASA FM: DAMAGED ELEMENT 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2241X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0119-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2241 
ITEM: BALLAST SELECT VALVE (BALLAST VALVE ASSEMBLY) 
(1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  I "  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-503 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2242X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0446-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2242 
ITEM: BALLAST VALVE TO BALLAST CONTROL VALVE LINES AND 
FITTINGS (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] C N I  I N 1  C N I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: BASED ON COMMENT FOR BLOCKED SCREEN FAILURE, THE 
FAILURE ANALYZED SHOULD HAVE THE SAME CRITICALITY OF 3/2R PNP. 
A POTENTIAL LOSS OF THE WCS WAS VIEWED AS A 3/2R CRITICALITY BY 
THE IOA FOR ANY "OFF NOMINAL" CONDITION. "OFF NOMINAL" WAS 
DEFINED AS ANY FAILURE WHICH COULD REQUIRE USE OF CONTINGENCY 
WASTE COLLECTION METHODS IF ANOTHER FAILURE OCCURRED. HOWEVER, 
THE NASA FMEA LISTED THESE AS A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL FAILURE 
CRITICALITY. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2243X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0446-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2243 
ITEM: BALLAST VALVE TO BALLAST CONTROL VALVE LINES AND 
FITTINGS (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  I I "  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  I 1  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 / 3  3 1 1  [ I  [ I  I 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA F'M: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW / EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-505 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2244X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0502-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2244 
ITEM: THIGH BAR RESTRAINT (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  1 1  
I I *  
[ I  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
c 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS IN "IN-USE" POSITION 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2245X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0505-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W C X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2245 
ITEM: WCS BYPASS SWITCH (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  C l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
C 3 /2R 1 [ P I  C NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: SHORTED TO GROUND 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-507 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2246X 
NASA FMEA 8 :  06-2-0436-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2246 
ITEM: WASTE TANK INLET LINES AND FITTINGS (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  I NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 





























ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2247X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0437-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2247 
ITEM: WASTE TANK OUTLET LINES AND FITTINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  I [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
1 
I 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-509 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2248X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0314-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
= [ X I  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2248 
ITEM: HYDROPHOBIC FILTER (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  I NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
r 3 /2R 1 C P I  [ NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-510 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2249X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0431-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2249 
ITEM: CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE QD AND PLUG (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ F l  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ F l  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / I [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-511 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-225OX 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0431-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 




CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE QD AND PLUG (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  1 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
IOA/NASA F’M: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2251X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2037-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2251 
ITEM: WASTE DUMP VALVE SWITCH INDICATOR (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA ( 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I "  
IOA ( 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE ( / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
( 3 1 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: FAILS OPEN 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-513 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2252X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2037-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2252 
ITEM: WASTE DUMP VALVE SWITCH 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ / ] [ : I  C N I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: SHORTED TO GROUND 
IOA COMMENT: THE FIRST FAILURE IS POTENTIAL PROBLEM IF VALVE 
OPEN AT FAILURE BECAUSE OF LOST CONTINGENCY DUMP CAPABILITY. 
POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE IF DUMP ISOLATION VALVE FAILS TO CLOSE IF 
DUMP VALVE IS OPEN AT FAILURE, THUS CRITICALITY 2/1R PNP. 
THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS WAS DUE TO NO DETAILED 
DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGERS REGARDING THE 
REDUNDANT PATHS. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 12/22/87 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-2253X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-0215-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2253 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR INLET HOSE FROM COMMODE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
COMPARE [ / J C J  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW, EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 















BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
I 
K. BARICXMAN I 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2254 
SCREEN, DOWNSTREAM OF BAUAST/REPRESS SCREEN (1) 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  C N I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
c 3 /2R 3 [ P I  I NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE REDUNDANCY SCREENS WAS DUE 
TO NO DETAILED DISCUSSION WITH THE NASA SUBSYSTEM MANAGERS 
REGARDING THE REDUNDANT PATHS. 















































BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
2255 
LINES AND FITTINGS, DUMP VALVE TO NOZZLE (1) 
K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  1 NAI [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
IOA COMMENT: NO LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE SITUATION, HOWEVER COULD BE 
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO CONTAMINATION OF PAYLOADS. 
THE EFFECTS OF WASTE WATER BEING DUMPED INTO THE CARGO BAY WAS 
CONSIDERED TO BE A LOSS OF MISSION FOR THE IOA ANALYSIS, NOT THE 
LOSS OF LIFE DESCRIBED BY THE NASA FMEA. 















BASELINE [ 3 
N E W I X I  
LIFE SUPPORT 
2256 





NASA [ 3 /1R ] 
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 
COMPARE [ /N 3 
BARICKMAN 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
A B C 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
IOA COMMENT: THE RESTRICTED EXTERNAL DUMP LINE IS NOT A 
LIFE/VEHICLE LOSS SITUATION, BUT COULD BE A LOSS OF MISSION IF 
MISSION DURATION EXCEEDS FCB/UCD SUPPLIES OR THE SUPPLY WATER 
DUMP LINE IS LOST. 
THE EFFECTS OF WASTE WATER BEING DUMPED INTO THE CARGO BAY WAS 
CONSIDERED TO BE A LOSS OF MISSION FOR THE IOA ANALYSIS, NOT THE 
LOSS OF LIFE DESCRIBED BY THE NASA FMEA. 

























ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3001 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3001 
ITEM: CB-SMOKE DETN BAY 2A/3B, 1B/3A, 1A/2B (CB8, 7, 
7) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  C N I  C l  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
PER NSTS-222006 (CN 4) PARAGRAPH 2.3.5A SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE 
THE SENSORS ARE OPERATING DURING LOS. VISUAL OPEN STATE OF 
CIRCUIT BREAKERS IS NOT CONSIDERED DETECTABLE. A POSSIBLE 
ADDITION TO THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT WOULD BE TO TRIGGER 
FDA IF THE OUTPUT FAILS TO ZERO, INDICATING LOSS OF POWER TO THE 
SENSOR. 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3002 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2000-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3002 
ITEM: CB-SMOKE DETN BAY 2A/3B, 1B/3A, 1A/2B (CB8, 7, 
7 )  
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 J E l  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 J [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-521 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3003 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3003 
ITEM: CB-SMOKE DETN L/R FLT DECK (CB7) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  c NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  C N 1  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
REMARKS : 
PER NSTS-22206 (CN 4) PARAGRAPH 2.3.5A SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE THE 
SENSORS ARE OPERATING DURING LOS. VISUAL OPEN STATE OF CIRCUIT 
BREAKERS IS NOT CONSIDERED DETECTABLE. A POSSIBLE ADDITION TO 
THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT WOULD BE TO TRIGGER FDA IF THE 
OUTPUT FAILS TO ZERO, INDICATING LOSS OF POWER TO SENSOR. 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3004 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2000-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3004 
ITEM: CB-SMOKE DETN L/R FLT DECK (CB7) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. =BET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  E l  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] C l  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-523 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3005 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3005 
ITEM: CB-SMOKE DETN CABIN (CB6) 
LEAD ANALYST: J . D .  ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  E NAI [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 E l  C N I  C l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 /1R 1 [ P I  C F I  [ P I  1 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
PER NSTS-22206 (CN 4) PARAGRAPH 2.3.5A SCREEN B FAILS BECAUSE THE 
SENSORS ARE OPERATING DURING LOS. VISUAL OPEN STATE OF CIRCUIT 
BREAKERS IS NOT CONSIDERED DETECTABLE. A POSSIBLE ADDITION TO 
THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT WOULD BE TO TRIGGER FDA IF THE 
OUTPUT FAILS TO ZERO, INDICATING LOSS OF POWER TO THE SENSOR. 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3006 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2000-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3006 
ITEM: CB-SMOKE DETN CABIN (CB6) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
1 
1 
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-525 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3007 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2001-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3007 
ITEM: CB-FIRE SUPPR, BAY 1, 2, 3 (CB8, 8, 9) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  1 1  
COMPARE [ / 3 C I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  I 1  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 



























ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3008 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2001-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3008 
ITEM: CB-FIRE SUPPR BAY 1, 2, 3. (CB8, 8 ,  9) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I "  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / I [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  1 1  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
I 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-527 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3009 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2078-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3009 
ITEM: RESISTOR-A2R1, A2R2, A2R3 (5.1K) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  E l  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 C I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
THE IOA & NASA CRITICALITIES MATCH AS ASSESSED VIA NSTA 22206, 
BUT THE CIRCUIT DESIGN ALLOWS FOR CONCERN BASED UPON THE SCENERIO 
OF A FAILED OPEN RESISTOR AND BOTTLE LEAK CAN RESULT IN AN EMPTY 
BOTTLE THAT CANNOT BE DETECTED. THESE COMBINED FAILURES 
SHOULD BE NOTED VIA GROUND TEST, BUT AFTER AV BAY CLOSE OUT AND 
ON-ORBIT THE CREW AND FLIGHT CONTROLLERS HAVE NO INSIGHT TO THE 
TOTAL PROBLEM. THIS LEADS ONE TO CONSIDER THE CRITICALITY AS A 
1R/2. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3010 
NASA FMEA #: N/A 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW I 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3010 
ITEM: RESISTOR-A2R1, A2R2, A2R3 (5.1K) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
SHORTS (TO GROUND OR END-TO-END) ARE NOT CONSIDERED A CREDIBLE 
FAILURE FOR THIS TYPE RESISTOR. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-529 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 












BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
3011 
SW-SMOKE DETECTION SENSOR RESET (S7) 
J.D. ARBET 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 I 1  I 1  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  I 1  ' C  I [ I  I 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
THIS FAILURE BY ITSELF IS ACTUALLY A 3/3. IF THE SENSORS ARE 
OUTWTING AN ALARM AND THIS SWITCH FAILS A RESET IF POSSIBLE 
USING THE ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER (CYCLE POWER). THE 
COMPLICATION THAT INDICATES A 1R3 COMES IF THE BREAKER FAILS 
TO CLOSE WHEN CYCLED AND THE REDUNDANT SENSOR ALSO FAILS. THESE 
FAILURES RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ANNUNCIATE A FIRE 
WITHIN THE AFFECTED AREA. THE INITIAL IOA ASSESSMENT WAS BASED 
UPON INFORMATION THAT CYCLING POWER DID NOT RESET THE 
SENSOR. IF THE SENSORS WERE EVER TRIGGERED WITHOUT A REAL FIRE 
CONDITION, SOME CAPABILIIES TO ANNUNCIATE A FIRE WOULD BE LOST 
AND SINCE THE SYSTEM IS AN EMERGENCY SYSTEM THE MISSION SHOULD BE 
TERMINATED TO ENSURE NO LOSS OF LIFE OR VEHICLE. 




















































BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
3012 
SW-SMOKE DETECTION SENSOR RESET (57) 
J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  C I  [ I  I 1  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
THE SMOKE STATUS INDICATIONS ARE LOST FOR THE SENSORS ASSOCIATE 
WITH 
Loss 
( A m  
THE CLOSED CONTACTS (CONTINUOUS RESET 
OF CREW/VEHICLE WITH LOSS OF ALL LIKE 
ALARM OUTPUTS). 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-531 
ISSUED). POSSIBLE 
AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3013 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2029-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3013 
ITEM: SW-SMOKE DETECTION CIRCUIT TEST (S8) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  E l  I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  I 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
THE IOA 61 NASA CRITICALITIES MATCH AS ASSESSED VIA NSTS 22206, 
BUT THE CIRCUIT DESIGN ALLOWS FOR CONCERN BASED UPON THE SCENERIO 
OF THE SWITCH SHORTED TO GROUND SO THAT THE CHANGE IN SUPPRESSANT 
CONTAINER PRESSURE CAN NOT BE ANNUNCIATED AND THE 
CONTAINER LEAKS BETWEEN THE GROUND CLOSEOUT AND THE NEXT SYSTEMS 
TEST. SEE ASSESSMENT LS-3015 FOR FURTHER DELINIATION. 


































BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
3013 
SW-SMOKE DETECTION CIRCUIT TEST (S8) 
J.D. ARBET 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] E l  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
C I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THE IOA 61 NASA CRITICALITIES MATCH AS ASSESSED VIA NSTS 22206, 
BUT THE CIRCUIT DESIGN ALLOWS FOR CONCERN BASED UPON THE SCENERIO 
OF THE SWITCH SHORTED TO GROUND SO THAT THE CHANGE IN SUPPRESSANT 
CONTAINER PRESSURE CAN NOT BE ANNUNCIATED AND THE CONTAINER 
LEAKS BETWEEN THE GROUND CLOSEOUT AND THE NEXT SYSTEMS TEST. SEE 
ASSESSMENT LS-3015 FOR FURTHER DELINIATION. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-533 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3014 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2029-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3014 
ITEM: SW-SMOKE DETECTION CIRCUIT TEST (S8) 
LEAD ANALYST: J . D .  ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] C N I  I N 1  C N I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 1  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THE SMOKE STATUS INDICATIONS ARE LOST FOR THE SENORS ASSOCIATED 
WITH THE CLOSED CONTACTS (SENSOR CONTINUOUSLY IN TEST). POSSIBLE 
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE WITH LOSS OF ALL LIKE AND UNLIKE REDUNDANCY 
(SENSOR SMOKE CONCENTRATION OUTPUT AND REDUNDANT SENSOR). 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3015 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-330003-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3015 
ITEM: FIRE SUPPRESSANT PRESSURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FTJNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 1 1 .  E l  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] E l  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E / 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE E ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THE IOA 61 NASA CRITICALITIES MATCH AS ASSESSED VIA NSTS 22206, 
BUT THE CIRCUIT DESIGN ALLOWS FOR CONCERN BASED UPON THE SCENERIO 
OF THE PRESSURE SWITCH FAILED SUCH THAT THE GROUND CANNOT BE 
REMOVED AND THEREFORE NO CHANGE IN PRESSURE INDICATED, AND A 
BOTTLE LEAK THAT CAN RESULT IN AN EMPTY BOTTLE THAT CANNOT BE 
DETECTED. THESE COMBINED FAILURES SHOULD BE DETECTED VIA GROUND 
TEST, BUT AFTER AV BAY CLOSEOUT AND ON-ORBIT CREW C FLIGHT 
CONTROLLERS HAVE NO INSIGHT TO THE TOTAL PROBLEM THE ONLY WAY THE 
SCENERIO IS DETECTED IS IF THE SUPPRESSENT IS REQUIRE TO PUT OUT 
A FIRE AND NO EFFECT IS GAINED BY ACTIVATING THE BOTTLE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-535 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3016 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-330003-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3016 
ITEM: FIRE SUPPRESSANT PRESSURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: J . D .  ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  1 1  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] 1 3  1 1  I 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 






ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3017 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2255-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3017 
ITEM: DIODE-A4CR1, A4CR2, A4CR3 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] I N 1  [ N I  [ N l  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  E l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THIS FAILURE BY ITSELF IS ACTUALLY A 3/3. IF THE SENSORS 
OUTPUTING AN ALARM AND THIS SWITCH FAILS, A RESET IS POSSIBLE 
USING THIS ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER (CYCLE POWER). THE 
COMPLICATION THAT INDICATES A 1R3 COMES IF THE BREAKER FAILS 
TO CLOSE WHEN CYCLED AND THE REDUNDANT SENSOR ALSO FAILS. THESE 
FAILURES RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO ANNUNCIATE A FIRE. 
THE DIODES COULD BE REMOVED AND IMPROVE CIRCUIT DESIGN SINCE THE 
RESET SWITCH ALSO PROVIDES CIRCUIT ISOLATION. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-537 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3018 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2255-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3018 
ITEM: DIODE-A4CR1, A4CR2, A4CR3 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 


















ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3019 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2252-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3019 
ITEM: DIODE-A3CR18 A3CR2, A3CR3 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 C I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-539 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3020 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2252-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3020 
ITEM: DIODE-A3CRl, A3CR2, A3CR3 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N I C N I  C N I  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  C l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
A SHORT OF ONE DIODE AND A SHORT (CLOSED) OF THE RESET SWITCH 
CONTACT ASSOCIATED WITH THAT DIODE WOULD INHIBIT THE HARDWARE 
ALARM CIRCUIT FOR ALL SENSORS UNTIL THE APPROPRIATE CIRCUIT 
BREAKER WAS OPENED THEN ONLY TWO AV BAY SENSORS (NON-REDUNDANT) 
WOULD BE LOST. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3021 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2077-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3021 
ITEM: RESISTOR-AlR12 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X J 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  I 1  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] I 1  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-541 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3022 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2077-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3022 
ITEM: RESISTOR-AlR12 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 J [ I  [ I  E l  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : ( If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3023 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2076-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3023 
ITEM: RESISTOR A6R2, R4, R6, R8, R10, R14, R16, R18, 
R20 (5.1K) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 J I 1  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE ( ] 
REMAFUZS: 




SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3024 
ITEM: RESISTOR A6R4, R6, R8, R10, R14, R16, R18, R20 
(5.1K) 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3024 
NASA FMEA #: N/A 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW 1 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  C N 1  C N I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
SHORTS (TO GROUND OR END-TO-END) ARE NOT CONSIDERED A CREDIBLE 
FAILURE FOR THIS TYPE RESISTOR. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3025 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2076-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3025 
ITEM: RESISTOR A6R2 (CABIN) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
RESISTOR ONLY EFFECTS TELEMETRY INDICATION TO THE GROUND. THIS 
COMPONENT WAS ORIGINALLY ANALYZED AS PART OF LS-3023. ALSO, A 
SHORT END-TO-END IS THE ONLY CREDIBLE FAILURE MODE RELATED TO A 
RESISTOR SHORT. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-545 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3026 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2074-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3026 
ITEM: RESISTOR A6R1, R3, R5, R7, R9, R13, R15, R17, 
R19 (12K) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  I 1  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3027 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2075-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3027 
ITEM: 
(1.2K) 
RESISTOR AlR1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R8, R9, R10, R11 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  C F I  [ P I  [ X I  * 
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N I  E l  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ D l  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THE ALARM STILL WILL BE ISSUED VIA THE SMOKE CONCENTRATION FDA 
PARAMETER AND THE APPROPRIATE FIRE LIGHT WILL ILLUMINATE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-547 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3028 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2075-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3028 
ITEM: RESISTOR AlR2, R3, R4, R5, R8, R9, R10, R11 
(1.2K) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ : I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] C N I  C N I  C N I  1 3  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS BASE UPON A SHORT TO GROUND. A SHORT-TO- 
GROUND IS NOT CONSIDERED A CREDIBLE FAILURE FOR THIS TYPE 
RESISTOR. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3029 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2075-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3029 
ITEM: RESISTOR AlRl 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
INITIAL IOA ANALYSIS BASE UPON A SHORT TO GROUND. A SHORT-TO- 
GROUND IS NOT CONSIDERED A CREDIBLE FAILURE FOR THIS TYPE 
RESISTOR. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-549 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3030 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2251-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3030 
ITEM: DIODE AlCR1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 





NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
THE FAILURE IS DETECTED BY THE SMOKE DETECTOR CONCENTRATION FDA 
ALERT AND SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-550 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3031 
NASA FEiEA #: 05-6V-2251-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3031 
ITEM: DIODE AlCR1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-551 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3032 
NASA FMEA #: N/A 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3032 
ITEM: DIODE AlCR1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N J C N I  C N I  I N 1  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
JANTWIN4246 DIODE IS NOT CONSIDERED TO SHORT-TO-GROUND. 












ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3033 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2075-2 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3033 
ITEM: RESISTOR A6Rl1, R12 (1.2K) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ D l  
( ADD/DELETE) 
3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
THESE RESISTORS ONLY EFFECT THE PAYLOAD SMOKE DETECTION ALL OTHER 
ALARMS WORK TO INDIACTE THE FIRE. BUT THE LOSS OF ALL LIKE AND 
UNLIKE REDUNDANCY (ALL ALARM OUTPUTS) COULD POSSIBLY RESULT I N  
LOSS OF THE CREW/VEHCILE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-553 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3034 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2075-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3034 
ITEM: RESISTOR A6Rl1, R12 (1.2K) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ I  
1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
ANALYSIS WAS BASED ON RESISTOR SHORT TO GROUND. CREDIBLE FAILURE 
IS RESISTOR SHORT END-TO-END. THE EFFECT OF AN END-TO-END 
IS LOSS OF CURRENT LIMITED TO THE PAYLOAD OUTPUT DRIVER TO 
SHUTTLE SMOKE DETECTION LAMP. 











































ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3035 
NASA FMEA #: N/A 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3035 
ITEM: RESISTOR A6Rl1, R12 (1.2K) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW 1 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  I N 1  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
SHORTS (TO GROUND) ARE NOT CONSIDERED A CREDIBLE FAILURE FOR THIS 
TYPE RESISTOR. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-555 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3036 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2251-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3036 
ITEM: DIODE A6CR1, CR2 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / I [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
ALL OTHER ALARMS WORK TO INDICATE THE FIRE AND THE SOURCE CAN BE 
IDENTIFIED BY SUBSEQUENT ANALYSIS. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3037 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2251-2 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3037 
ITEM: DIODE A6CR1, CR2 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW I 1 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 J 1 1  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
1 1  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 / 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  E 3  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-557 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3038 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2074-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3038 
ITEM: RESISTOR AlR6, R7 (12R) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X I  
NASA [ 3 /3 ] E l  [ I  C I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] I 1  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
C I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  C I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3039 
NASA FMEA #: N/A 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3039 
ITEM: RESISTOR AlR6, R7 (12K) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW 1 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  E N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
SHORTS (TO GROUND OR END-TO-END) ARE NOT CONSIDERED A CREDIBLE 
FAILURE FOR THIS TYPE RESISTOR. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-559 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3040 
NASA FMEA #: N/A 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3040 
ITEM: ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY (ACA) 1 AND 2 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
E l  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
BASED UPON LOSS OF ALL ALARM ANNUNCATION REDUNDANCY (LIKE & 
UNLIKE) THE POSSIBILITY FOR LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE EXISTS. 

















































BASELINE [ ] 
NEW I 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
3041 
ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY (ACA) 1 AND 2 
J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
LAMP ILLUMINATION WITH NO OTHER ALARMS ONLY REQUIRES ANALYSIS TO 
ENSURE NO FIRE EXISTS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-561 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3042 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2311-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3042 
ITEM: SMOKE DETECTION LIGHT MATRIX-LAMPS 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  E N 1  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  C D I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
FAILURE CAN BE DETECTED INFLIGHT WHEN ALARMS ANNUNCIATE THE FIRE 
BUT LIGHT DOES NOT. SOFTWARE FDA PROVIDES SOURCE OF FIRE. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3043 
NASA FMEA #: N/A 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3043 
ITEM: C&W ELECTRONICS UNIT SIREN A & B 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
I 3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (ALARM ANNUNCIATIONS) COULD RESULT IN LOSS 
OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-563 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3044 
NASA FMEA t :  05-6V-202 6-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ I 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3044 
ITEM: SWITCH-FIRE SUPPRESSION AV BAY 1, 2, 3 -/SAFE 
(SI, 2, 3) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] C N I  C N I  E N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3045 
NASA EMEA #: 05-6V-2071-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3045 
ITEM: RESISTOR-NO IDENTIFIER (2.2K) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  C I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-565 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3046 BASELINE [ ] 
NASA FMEA #: N/A 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3046 
ITEM: RESISTOR-NO IDENTIFIER (2.2K) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] I N 1  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
NEW 5 j 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
SHORTS (TO GROUND OR END-TO-END) ARE NOT CONSIDERED A CREDIBLE 
FAILURE FOR THIS TYPE RESISTOR. 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3047 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2072-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3047 
ITEM: RESISTOR-NO IDENTIFIER (1.8K) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
r I "  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  E l  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-567 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3048 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2028-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3048 
ITEM: SWITCH-FIRE SUPPRESSION AV BAY 1, 2, 3 AGENT 
DISCH (S4, S5, S6) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-568 
APPENDIX C 





ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3049 
NASA FMEA #: 05-06-2310-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3049 
ITEM: LIGHT-FIRE SUPPRESSION AV BAY 1, 2, 3 AGENT 
DISCH (S4, S5, S6) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THE IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEET ERRONEOUSLY LISTS THE FAILURE AS 
PREMATURE OPERATION. THE FAILURE MODE SHOULD BE FAILS OPEN. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-569 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 















ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY (ACA) 3 
J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 










COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
I 
I 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
I 
REMARKS: 
FAILURE CAN BE DETECTED INFLIGHT WHEN ALARMS ANNUNCIATE THE FIRE 
FIRE. BUT LIGHT DOES NOT. SOFTWARE FDA PROVIDES SOURCE OF 
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF ALL REDUNDANT ALARM 
IS LOST. 









ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3051 
NASA FMEA #: N/A 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3051 
ITEM: ANNUNCIATOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY (ACA) 3 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
LAMP ILLUMINATION WITH NO OTHER ALARMS ONLY REQUIRES ANALYSIS TO 
ENSURE NO FIRE EXISTS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-571 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3052 
NASA FMEA #: 05-06-2254-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3052 
ITEM: DIODE-NO IDENTIFIER 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-572 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3053 
NASA FMEA #: 05-06-2254-3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3053 
ITEM: DIODE-NO IDENTIFIER 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 / 1 R  ] [ P I  [ N l  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
A SHORT OF THIS DIODE HAS NO EFFECT ON THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT AND 
WOULD ONLY ALLOW AN ERRORONEOUS TELEMETRY INDICATION IF THE 
GROUND CIRCUIT IS ACTIVATED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-573 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3054 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2253-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3054 
ITEM: DIODE-NO IDENTIFIER 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ N l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  C N I  E N 1  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ D l  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
POST LAUNCH, OPEN ACTUALLY ISOLATES THE GROUND CIRCUIT BETTER 
THAN ANY OTHER CONDITION AND DOES NOT EFFECT THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT 
PRE-LAUNCH THE CIRCUIT PROVIDES CAPABILITY TO FIGHT A FIRE 
THROUGH GROUND COMMAND CAPABILITIES. THIS DIODE, THE ON BOARD 
CIRCUIT, AND THE PORTABLE BOTTLES MUST FAILS TO RESULT IN LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE. CONSIDERATIONS OF PREMATURE FIRING ARE ACTUALLY A 
FAIL SAFE CONDITION. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-574 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3055 
NASA F'MEA #: 05-6V-2073-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3055 
ITEM: RESISTOR-NO IDENTIFIER (5.11K) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ N l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  [ N I  [ N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THE FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT THUS THE ONLY 
CONSIDERATION IS ON THE LAUNCH PAD. FAILURE OF THE GROUND 
SYSTEMS TO DISCHARGE THE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER IS BACKED UP BY 
THE FLIGHT SYSTEM, PORTABLE BOTTLES, AND LAUNCH TOWER FIRE 
SYSTEMS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-575 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3056 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2302-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3056 
ITEM: PYRO CONTROLLER NO. 1, 2, 3 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 C N I  C N I  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/05/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3057 
NASA FMEA 8 :  0 5-671-2 3 0 2 -2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3057 
ITEM: PYRO CONTROLLER NO. 1, 2, 3 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ N l  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ X I  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 1 / 1  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  C A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
A PREMATURE OPERATION OF THIS CIRCUIT (SHORT INTERNAL) CAN 
INHIBIT THE ACTUAL FIRE VOLTAGE BY NOT ALLOWING THE CAPACITOR 
VOLTAGE TO BUILD UP. THUS THE WORST CASE CRITICALITY IS 111. IF 
THE NSI CAN FIRE AT A LOWER VOLTAGE OR IF THE FAILURE FIRES THE 
NSI PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL FIRE COMMAND THE FAILURE WOULD BE A 
CRITICALITY 3/3 SINCE THE DESIRE RESULTS ARE ACHIEVED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-577 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3058 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-311000-01 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
ITEM: SMOKE DETECTOR (9) 
MDAC ID: 3058 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
MOST LOGICAL FAILURE IS THE LOSS OF FLOW TO THE SENSING CHAMBERS 



























ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/10/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-3059 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-330001-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3059 
ITEM: FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY (9) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 2 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
THIS FAILURE REQUIRES MORE THOUGHT THAN ONE FMEA/CIL: 1) THE 
FAILURE BY ITSELF SHOULD BE INDICATED BY ILLUMINATION OF THE 
AGENT DISCHARGE LIGHT. UPON DISCHARGE (ASSUMING A HIGH LEAD 
RATE) THE AV BAY WOULD BE PROTECTED FOR UP TO 50 HRS. THUS THE 
FAILURE ONLY HAS MISSION TERMINATION EFFECTS AND LOSS OF 
LEAK WOULD REDUCE THIS AV BAY PROTECTION TIME BUT DETECTION WOULD 
STILL BE INDICATED VIA THE AGENT DISCHARGE LIGHT. IF THE RATE 
IS SLOW ENOUGH IT WILL BE DETECTED BY GROUND CHECKOUT BETWEEN 
MISSION: 3) THE MAJOR PROBLEM IS IF FOLLOWING GROUND CHECKOUT THE 
RESISTOR THAT PROVIDES CURRENT LIMITING FOR THE CIRCUIT FAILS 
OPEN OR THE PRESSURE SWITCH CONTACT FAILS CLOSED, OR THE 
CIRCUIT IS SHORTED TO GROUND NO AGENT DISCHARGE LIGHT 
ILLUMINATION CAN TAKE PLACE AND THEN THIS FAILURE CAN BE 
CATASTROPHIC IF THE LEAK IS UNDETECTED AND COMPLETE PRIOR TO 
LIFT-OFF. THUS THE FAILURE WOULD APPEAR AS A 1R/2. 
CREW/VEHICLE ARE NOT THE CONCERN: 2) THE FAILURE ASSUMING A SLOW 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-579 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3060 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-330005-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW I 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3060 
ITEM: FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY (9) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E.  DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 1 /1 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I /. 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 







































BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
LIFE SUPPORT 
3060 
FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY (9) 
R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  E l  [ I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  I 1  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-581 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3060B 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-330050-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3060 
ITEM: FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY (9) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID:  LS-3061 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-371000-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X I  
SUBSYSTEM: L I F E  SUPPORT 
MDAC I D :  3061 
ITEM: PORTABLE F I R E  SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
C R I T I C A L I T Y  REDUNDANCY SCREENS C I L  
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 1 R  ] [ P I  r NAI [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N I  [ N I  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: ( I f  different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* C I L  RETENTION RATIONALE: ( I f  applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY (ALL PORTABLE BOTTLES) COULD RESULT I N  
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-583 
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APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/11/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3062 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-371000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3062 
ITEM: PORTABLE FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSEMBLY 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ F l  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
A JAMMED ACTUATOR WILL BE KNOW IMMEDIATELY UPON USAGE. 





























ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3063 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2204-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW I 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3063 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE 111) (3) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  E l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THE FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT THUS THE ONLY 
CONSIDERATION IS ON THE LAUNCH PAD. FAILURE OF THE GROUND 
SYSTEMS TO DISCHARGE THE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER IS BACKED UP BY 





REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-585 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 NASA DATA: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3064 BASELINE [ 3 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2203-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3064 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) (3) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N J C N I  C N I  I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I  * 
1 1  
I N 1  
[ D l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
THE FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON THE FLIGHT CIRCUIT THUS THE ONLY 
CONSIDERATION IS ON THE LAUNCH PAD. FAILURE OF THE GROUND 
SYSTEMS TO DISCHARGE THE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER IS BACKED UP BY 
SYSTEMS . 
I 
I THE FLIGHT SYSTEM, PORTABLE BOTTLES, AND LAUNCH TOWER FIRE 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-3065 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2202-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3065 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE 11) (3) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ N I  C N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-587 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3112X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2027-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3112 
ITEM: SWITCH-SMOKE DETECTOR SENSOR RESET (57) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 / 1  3 [ I  [ I  E l  [ X I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3114X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2029-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3114 
ITEM: SW-SMOKE DETECTOR CIRCUIT TEST (S8) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
EVEN WITH THE WORST CASE FAILURE REDUNDANT SENSING IS AVAILABLE 
IN ALL AREAS. EACH SENSOR STILL PROVIDES SMOKE CONCENTRATION 
DATA FOR FDA COMPUTATION. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-589 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3144X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-06-2026-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3144 
ITEM: SWITCH-FIRE SUPPRESSION AV BAY 1, 2, 3, =/SAFE 
(Sl, s2, S3) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  E l  [ . I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  E l  [ I  C I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/06/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3148X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2028-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3148 
ITEM: SW-FIRE SUPPRESSION AV BAY 1, 2, 3 AGENT DISCH 
LEAD ANALYST: J . D .  ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  I NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ A ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THE FAILURE COUPLED WITH A FAILURE OF THE ONE SECOND TIME DELAY 
CAN INHIBIT THE DISCHANGE OF THE FIRE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER. 
WORST CASE IS DURING ASCENT AND DEORBIT. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-591 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/09/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3154X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2253-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3154 
ITEM: DIODE-NO IDENTIFIER 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  I NAI [ P I  E X ] *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ F l  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] C N I  I N 1  [ I  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THE AS RUN GROUND TURNAROUND TEST UNDER MOST CONDITIONS WILL NOT 
DETECT THE FAILURE. 
I 





















ASSESSMENT DATE : 
ASSESSMENT ID: 



























SMOKE DETECTOR (9) 
J.D. ARBET 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  C I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-593 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID:  LS-3163X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-06-2204-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X I  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID:  3163 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE 1 1 1 )  ( 3 )  
LEAD ANALYST: J .D.  ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS C I L  
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 1 R  ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I *  
I O A  [ 3 / 1 R  ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] 1 1  C N I  C l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: ( I f  d i f f e ren t  from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* C I L  RETENTION RATIONALE: (If a p p l i c a b l e )  
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3164X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2203-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3164 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) (3) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
2 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
PRELAUNCH PORTABLE BOTTLES ARE AVAILABLE TO DISCHARGE SUPPRESSANT 
INTO THE BAY. THIS IS ALSO TRUE FOR ONORBIT AND LANDING/SAFING. 
DURING LIFT OFF AND DEORBIT, A FAILURE OF THE PRE-FLIGHT BUS 
\WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ISSUE THE COMMAND VIA THIS FAILURE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-595 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3165X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2202-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3165 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE 11) (3) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 1 /1 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID:  LS-3166X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-2201-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3166 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I )  - SMOKE DETECTOR GROUND 
RESET 
LEAD ANALYST: J .D .  ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS C I L  
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 1 R  ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
I O A  [ 3 / 1 R  ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : ( I f  d i f f e ren t  from NASA) 
[ D l  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 1 R  1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* C I L  RETENTION RATIONALE: ( I f  a p p l i c a b l e )  
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THE FAILURE IS  DETECTABLE THROUGH THE REDUNDANT SENSING 
CAPABILITY. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-597 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 1/07/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3167X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6V-22 01-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3167 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) - SMOKE DETECTOR GROUND 
RESET 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  I 1  r I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  I 1  I 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3168X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-330050-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3168 
ITEM: NASA STANDARD INITIATOR 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
ASSESSMENT: I 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  C N I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
ILLUMINATES AND VIA THE TELEMETRY PARAMETER. 
THE FAILURE WILL BE NOTED INFLIGHT WHEN THE AGENT DISCHARGE LIGHT 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 c-599 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
I ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/15/88 ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3258X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-311000-03 
I SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
MDAC ID: 3258 
ITEM: SMOKE DETECTOR (9) 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] I F 3  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REHARKS: 
DURING GROUND TURNAROUND TEST THE ONLY TRUE TEST OF THE 
CONCENTRATION PARAMETER WOULD BE TO VERIFY A KNOWN CONCENTRATION 
LEVEL WHICH THE PROCEDURES DO NOT ATTEMPT. SIMILAR LOGIC APPLIES 
TO THE INFLIGHT CASE. 








































ASSESSMENT DATE: 2/16/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-3268X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-2-330050-2 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3268 
ITEM: NASA STANDARD INITIATOR 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
NASA [ 1 /1 J [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 1 /1 J [ I  [ I  I 1  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-601 
c.4 





























ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5001 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2017-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5001 
ITEM: VISUAL PRESSURE GAUGE 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  r I "  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-603 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5002 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1207-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5002 
ITEM: ECLSS H20 SUPPLY PRESS. SENSOR (V64-PO201A) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N I [ N l  I N 1  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5002. LOSS OF PRESSURE INDICATION DOES NOT 
LEAD TO "DEADHEADING" OF FUEL CELLS. 








































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5003 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1206-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5003 
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  E l  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  [ N I  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
r-2 /2 1 I 1  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN 
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE 
TO T H I S  FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER I S  A SECOND 
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE 
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS # 5 0 0 3 .  
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-605 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5004 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1206-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5004 
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 




NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  C P I  C P I  I I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  I 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5004. LOSS OF THE FUNCTION TO SEAL THE WATER 
ON THE LINE DOES NOT LEAD TO LOSS OF FES. A REVALVING OF THE 
MISSIONS ARE STILL LOST. 
SUPPLY WATER SYSTEM WILL CORRECT THE FAILURE; HOWEVER EVA 
























ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5005 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1206-3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5005 
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY VALVE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  I 1  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5005.  LOSS OF THE FUNCTION TO SEAL THE WATER 
ON THE LINE DOES NOT LEAD TO LOSS OF FES. A REVALVING OF THE 
SUPPLY WATER SYSTEM WILL CORRECT THE FAILURE; HOWEVER EVA 
MISSIONS ARE STILL LOST. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-607 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5006 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2008-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5006 
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY SWITCH (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FTJNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] I N 1  I N 1  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5006.  FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE 
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN 
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS OF DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE 
THE LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION 
NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003. 








































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5006A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2008-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5006 
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY SWITCH (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ N l  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  E 3  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5006 .  FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE 
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN 
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE 
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION 
NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-609 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5007 
NASA FMEA t: 05-6UA-2012-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5007 
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY STATUS INDICATOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /3 J [ I  [ I  [ I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 J 1 1  [ I  E l  [ I  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  [ : I  [ I  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
r 3 / 3  1 I 1  [ I  [ I  1 3  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS : 
ITEM IS NOT MISSION ESSENTIAL. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-610 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5008 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2005-1 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5008 
ITEM: RESISTOR (AlR1 AND A2R1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /3 J [ I  C J  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 J [ I  C J  [ I  1 1  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-611 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5009 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2000-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5009 
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  C N I  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ X I  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
SAME SCENARIO (WORST CASE) AS FOR VALVE FAILED CLOSED (#5003). 
NASA DATA IS NOT AVAILABLE, BUT IOA & NASA'A CRITICALITIES ARE 
CONSISTENT WITH #5003 & 06-1A-1206-1 THUS, THE ISSUE FOLLOWS THE 
LOGIC OF ASSESSMENT # 5 0 0 3 .  






ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5010 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2000-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X I  
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5010 
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER (2) 





CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-613 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5011 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1212-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5011 
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER VALVE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
E I *  
[ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  C N I  I N 1  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5011. PRE 51-L ANALYSIS SAYS LOSS OF 
REDUNDANCY. HOWEVER, WITH TWO SUITED CREWMAN, THERE IS NO 
REDUNDANCY, THUS LOSS OF MISSION. 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5012 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-12 12-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5012 
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER VALVE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  c NAI [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5012. FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE 
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN 
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE 
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION 
NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-615 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 













EMU WASTE WATER VALVE (2) 
R.E. DUFFY 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  E l  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
FUNCTIONAL CRIT 2R IS USED DUE TO THE FREE WATER IN THE CABIN AND 
THE FACT THAT THE CREWMEN MAY NOT USE THE DRAIN TO SERVICE THE 
EMU WATER TANKS. 
































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5014 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2009-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5014 
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER SWITCH (2) 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  [ N I  I N 1  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
[ 2 / 2  1 I 1  [ I  I 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
SAME SCENARIO (WORST CASE) AS FOR VALVE FAILED CLOSED (#5011), 
(NASA 06-1-1212-1). WITH TWO SUITED CREWMAN THERE IS NO 
REDUNDANCY THUS LOSS OF MISSION. 
I 
I 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-617 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5014A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2009-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5014 
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER SWITCH (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 2 /2  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
I RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
SAME SCENARIO (WORST CASE) AS FOR VALVE FAILED CLOSED (#5011), 
(NASA 06-1-1212-1). WITH TWO SUITED CREWMAN THERE IS NO 
REDUNDANCY, THUS MISSION LOSS. 































BASELINE [ ] 
N E W I X l  
LIFE SUPPORT 
5015 
EMU WASTE WATER STATUS INDICATOR (2) 
R . E .  DUFFY 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  C l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-619 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5016 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2005-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5016 
ITEM: RESISTOR (AlR2 AND A2R2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
m [ X l  
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 1 1  [ I  C l  
CIL 
ITEM 
C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5017 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2001-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5017 
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER CIRCUIT BREAKER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  r NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  [ N l  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5017. ASSUMING TWO CREWMEN THERE IS NO 
REDUNDANCY FOR EACH CREWMEN. THUS LOSS OF CB FORCES THE VALVE TO 
REMAIN CLOSED AND LOSS OF MISSION. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-621 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID:  IS-5018 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2001-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID:  5018 
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER CIRCUIT BREAKER ( 2 )  
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
C I L  
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If d i f fe ren t  f r o m  NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* C I L  RETENTION RATIONALE: ( I f  a p p l i c a b l e )  
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 



































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5019 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1210-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5019 
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY AND WASTE COUPLINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ /NA ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : ( If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
/NA 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
HARDWARE HAS BEEN DELETED AND IS NOT FLOWN. (PER H. ROTTER PRCB 
PRESENTATION SSV-87-92) I 
I 
I 





ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5020 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1208-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5020 
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY LINES AND FITTING 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N I  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS # 5 0 2 0 .  FUNCTIONAL LOSS LEADS TO INABILITY TO 
SERVICE THE EMU'S. HOWEVER, AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM. 
































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5021 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1209-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5021 
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER LINES AND FITTINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  E l  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
[ I  
E l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5021. FUNCTIONAL LOSS LEADS TO INABILITY TO 
SERVICE THE EMU'S. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-625 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 















02 SUPPLY LINES AND FITTINGS 
R.E. DUFFY 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] C N I  [ N l  I N 1  





C N I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
NO EXISTING EQUIVALENT NASA FMEA WAS FOUND FOR THIS FAILURE (SEE 
IOA ANALYSIS #5022). 













ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5023 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2016-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5023 
ITEM: VISUAL 02 PRESSURE GAUGE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
c 3 / 3  3 c 3  I 1  1 3  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-627 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5024 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1202-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W C X l  
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5024 
ITEM: 02 SUPPLY PRESSURE SENSOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
COMPARE [ / ] C l  1 3  C I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5025 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1201-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5025 
ITEM: EMU 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5025. ASSUMING A BASELINE OF TWO SUITED 
CREWMEMBERS AND NO CREW ACTION (RULE 2.3.3.f OF NSTS 22206). TWO 
CREWMEMBERS SHARING ONE SCU IS NOT A 'INOMINAL CREW ACTION", THUS 
LOSS OF MISSION. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-629 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5026 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1201-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5026 
ITEM: EMU 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N I [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
E l  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5026. LOSS OF 02 ISOLATION FUNCTION LEADS TO 
LOSS OF EVA AND SHUTTLE MISSION. THIS IS BECAUSE LV3 AND LV4 
WOULD BE CLOSED, AND THIS ACTION ISOLATES THE LEH'S. THUS, UPON 
FUNCTION LOSS, THE MISSION IS TERMINATED AND DEORBIT PLANNED 
FOR THE NEXT PLS. 




























ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5027 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1201-3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5027 
ITEM: EMU 02 SUPPLY VALVE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 1 / 1  1 [ I  [ ' I  [ I  C A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
FURTHER TO IOA ANALYSIS #5027. S"TLE MISSION IS LOST AND UNDER 
WORST CASE SCENARIO AN AOA CAN BE PERFORMED. HIGH PP02 CREATES A 
FIRE HAZARD WHICH HAS THE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. 
THERE IS NO LOSS OF 02 TO LEH'S IF SYSTEM IS KEPT OPEN, 
THAT IS, 02 WILL BE DISTRIBUTED ACROSS THE SYSTEM PER BERNOULLIS 
EQUATION. THE ENVIRONMENT PRESSURE IS THE SAME FOR ALL PARTS OF 
THIS SYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-631 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5028 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1205-3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5028 
ITEM: EMU 02 SUPPLY COUPLINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W I X I  
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5029 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1128-2 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5029 
ITEM: DEPRESS CAP VENT (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E.  DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  c I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  [ N I  C N I  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN 
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE 
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND 
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE 
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-633 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5030 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1127-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5030 
ITEM: CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN 
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE 
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND 
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE 
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003. 








































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5031 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1127-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5031 
ITEM: CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 / 1R ] [ P I  C P I  [ P I  C I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] C l  C l  [ I  C X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] C N I  [ N l  C N I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 C l  [ I  [ I  C A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN 
EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE 
TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND 
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE 
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-635 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID:  LS-5032 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1128-3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID:  5032 
ITEM: DEPRESS VALVE/- (1 EACH) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X I  
C I L  
ITEM 
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: ( I f  d i f f e ren t  f r o m  NASA) 
* C I L  RETENTION RATIONALE: ( I f  applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5032A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1126-4 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5032 
ITEM: DEPRESS VALVE/CAP (1 EACH) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ I  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
DUE TO LIMITED FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT 
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-637 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-5033 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1126-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5033 
ITEM: DEPRESS VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C N I  I N 1  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 




TO THIS FAILURE 
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
1 x 1  
C N I  
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
IS LOSS OF MISSION. THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN 
OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE 
IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER IS A SECOND 
FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 22206. FOR WORST CASE 
ANALYSIS SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5003. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5034 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1126-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5034 
ITEM: DEPRESS VALVE/CAP (1 EACH) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N J [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5034. FUNCTIONAL LOSS OF VENTING VIA THE 
VACUUM VENT LINE ALSO PRECLUDES REPRESSURIZING THE AIRLOCK. 
HOWEVER, THE DEPRESSURIZATION VALVE LEAKS 0.1 PSI PER SECOND, 
WHILE BOTH EQUALIZATION VALVES OPEN ON PRESSURE AT A RATE OF 
0.5 PSI PER SECOND. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-639 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5034A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1128-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5034 
ITEM: DEPRESS VALVE/CAP (1 EACH) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /1R I [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  r i  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS: 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5034. FUNCTIONAL LOSS OF VENTING VIA THE 
VACUUM VENT LINE ALSO PRECLUDES REPRESSURIZING THE AIRLOCK. 
HOWEVER, THE DEPRESSURIZATION VALVE LEAKS 0.1 PSI PER SECOND, 
WHILE BOTH EQUALIZATION VALVES OPEN ON PRESSURE AT A RATE OF 
0.5 PSI PER SECOND. 





























ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5035 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1603-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5035 
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ X I  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5035. NASA FMEA NOT AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, THERE 
ARE ONLY TWO EQUALIZATION VALVES, THUS ONLY TWO PIECES OF 
HARDWARE THAT CAN ALLOW REPRESSURIZATION OF THE AIRLOCK AFTER AN 
EVA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-641 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5035A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1603-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5035 
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE C N / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5035. NASA FMEA NOT AVAILABLE. HOWEVER, THERE 
ARE ONLY TWO EQUALIZATION VALVES, THUS ONLY TWO PIECES OF 
HARDWARE THAT CAN ALLOW REPRESSURIZATION OF THE AIRLOCK AFTER AN 
EVA . 
































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5036 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1603-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5036 
ITEM: AIRIDCK TO CABIN VENT CAP (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION SINCE THE VALVE IS AN UNLIKE 
REDUNDANCY TO THE CAP. HOWEVER THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY 
PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION SEE ASSESSMENT 
#LS-5003. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-643 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5037 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1602-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5037 
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN FILTER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5038 
NASA FMEA #: 01-1-1602-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W I X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5038 
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN FILTER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  [ N l  C N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 3 1 3  I [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
FAILURE IS QUESTIONABLE. LOSS OF FILTERATION DOES NOT CAUSES 
VALVE FAILURE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-645 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5039 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1601-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
= [ X I  
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5039 
ITEM: AIRIDCK TO CABIN EQUALIZATION VALVE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ / ] C I  I N 1  C I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
NONE 





























ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5040 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1601-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5040 
ITEM: AIRXDCK TO CABIN EQUALIZATION VALVE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E.  DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 / 1 R  ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
r 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
WORST CASE SCENARIO HARDWARE LOSS IS VALVE OPEN, CAP DOES NOT 
MATE. EVA MISSION IS CALLED SHORT/OFF AND FURTHER MISSIONS ARE 





REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-647 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5041 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1601-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5041 
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN EQUALIZATION VALVE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  E l  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN 
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE 
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES NSTS 22206. FOR IOA 
ANALYSIS SEE THE LIFE SUPPORT ID# 5041. 





























ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5042 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1604-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5042 
ITEM: AIRWCK TO CABIN PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] 1 1  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  r i  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-649 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5042A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1605-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5042 
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO CABIN PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5043 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1604-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5043 
ITEM: AIRLOCX TO CABIN PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 2 / 2  1 r 1  1 1  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
WORST CASE SCENARIO HARDWARE LOSS IS VALVE OPEN, CAP DOES NOT 
MATE. EVA MISSION IS CALLED SHORT/OFF 
CANCELLED. THUS FUNCTION LOSS IS LOSS 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-651 
AND FURTHER MISSIONS ARE 
OF EVA MISSION. 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5043A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1605-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5043 
ITEM: AIRLOCX TO CABIN PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ 2 / 2  1 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
WORST CASE SCENARIO HARDWARE LOSS IS VALVE OPEN, CAP DOES NOT 
MATE. EVA MISSION IS CALLED SHORT/OFF AND FURTHER MISSIONS ARE 
CANCELLED. THUS FUNCTION LOSS IS LOSS OF EVA MISSION. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5044 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1104-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5044 
ITEM: AIRLOCK DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT 
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-653 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5044A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1114-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5044 
ITEM: A I W C K  DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT 
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5045 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1632-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5045 
ITEM: AIRLOCK WALL TEMPERATURE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-655 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5046 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1124-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5046 
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT VENT CAP (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
I 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
I RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN 
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE LATTER 
IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES NSTS 22206. FOR IOA ANALYSIS 
SEE THE LIFE SUPPORT ID#5041. 




















































BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
LIFE SUPPORT 
5047 
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT VENT CAP (2) 
R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  E I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  E l  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N I  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  1 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT 
OF THIS ITEM W A S  ATTEMPTED. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-657 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5048 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1123-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5048 
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT FILTER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 1 [ I  [ I  E l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
r 3 /2R I [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  1 3  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSUMING AN 
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE 
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES NSTS 22206. FOR IOA 
ANALYSIS SEE THE LIFE SUPPORT ID# 5041. 

































BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
5049 
AIRIDCK TO AMBIENT FILTER (2) 
R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  I 1  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] C N I  [ N l  I N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5049. FAILURE IS QUESTIONALBE. LOSS OF 
FILTERATION DOES NOT CAUSE VALVE TO FAIL OPEN. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-659 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5050 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1122-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  




AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT EQUALIZATION VALVE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
AS SES SMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
c 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. ASSURING AN 
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE 
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES NSTS 22206. FOR IOA 
ANALYSIS SEE THE LIFE SUPPORT ID#5041. 





















































BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
LIFE SUPPORT 
5051 
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT EQUALIZATION VALVE (2) 
R.E. DUFFY 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
IOA ANALYSIS #5041 ASSUMED THE TUNNEL ADAPTER WAS ATTACHED. 
WITHOUT THIS THE AIRLOCK WOULD LEAK TO SPACE FORCING EVALUATION 
BY THE AIRLOCK CREW. THE LEAK CANNOT BE GREATER THAN TWO 
EQUALIZATION VALVES WIDE OPEN ON THE CABIN SIDE. EACH VALVE ALSO 
HAS A THREATED CAP WHICH IS CAPABLE OF A PRESSURE SEAL. WORST 
CASE SCENARIO IS LOSS OF FURTHER MISSIONS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-661 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5052 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1122-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5052 
ITEM: AIRIDCK TO AMBIENT EQUALIZATION VALVE (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
1 x 1  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  I 1  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY PIECE OF EQUIPMENT. 
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE 
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES NSTS 22206. 
ANALYSIS SEE THE LIFE SUPPORT ID# 5041. 
ASSUMING AN 
FOR IOA 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5053 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1120-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5053 
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  1 N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 3 1 3  1 [ I  1 1  1 1  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
CREW INCONVENIENCE. SEE IOA ANALYSIS # 5042. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-663 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5053A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1121-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5053 
ITEM: AIRIDCK TO AMBIENT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  I I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 J [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / I [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
CREW INCONVENIENCE. SEE IOA ANALYSIS # 5042. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5054 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1120-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5054 
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 3 C l  [ I  [ I  E X ] *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  C I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT 
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 




ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5054A 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1121-4 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5054 
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL (2) 
I 
~ LEAD ANALYST: ROE. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /2 ] E l  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT 
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 







































ASSESSMENT DATE : 
ASSESSMENT ID: 











BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
LIFE SUPPORT 
5055 
EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER BUS SELECT SWITCH (2) 
R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  I *  
IOA [ 2 /2  3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT 
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY TO EACH O F  
THE SWITCH/SYSTEMS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-667 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5055A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2008-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X J  




EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER BUS SELECT SWITCH (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N J C N I  [ N l  C N I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I "  
[ X I  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS: 
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT 
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY TO EACH OF 
THE SWITCH/SYSTEMS. 































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5056 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5056 
ITEM: EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER RPC ( 4 ) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ X I  
C A I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
1 
I REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-669 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5057 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5057 
ITEM: EMU POWER/BA'ITERY CHARGER DIODE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
c I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
THERE W A S  NO NASA ALSS F'MEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5058 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW 1 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5058 
ITEM: EMU POWER/BA"l'ERY CHARGER DIODE (4) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FTJNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-671 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5059 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW c 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5059 
ITEM: EMU POWER/BATTERY CHARGER POWER SUPPLY (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 2 / 2  I [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALIDCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 





























ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5060 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW I 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5060 
ITEM: EMU POWER/BAT!l!ERY CHARGER POWER SUPPLY (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] C l  [ I  [ I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
C 2 / 2  1 C l  C l  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 





REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-673 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5061 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW c 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5061 
ITEM: EMU INPUT SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
[ I *  
[ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C I  [ I  [ I  E 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  1 1  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 

































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5062 
NASA FMEA #: 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5062 
ITEM: EMU VOLT/CURRENT INDICATOR 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 1  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  I 1 1  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-675 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID:  IS-5063 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID:  5063 
ITEM: EMU POWER SUPPLY CURRENT SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS C I L  
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C l  C l  1 1  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: ( I f  d i f f e ren t  from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* C I L  RETENTION RATIONALE: ( I f  applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
NASA FMEA #: 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5064 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5064 
ITEM: EMU POWER SUPPLY VOLTAGE SENSOR 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-677 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5065 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1631-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5065 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /lR ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 1 1  [ I  [ I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
3 /2R 1 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
SEE IOA ANALYSIS #5065. IN ADDITION, THE VALVES BUTTERFLY HAS A 
PURGE HOLE TO PREVENT BUILD-UP OF GASES IN THE DUCT. ASSIGNED 
CRITICALITY HAS TO RESTRICT ITSELF TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
PRESENT FAILURE. WORST CASE SCENARIO SHOWS THAT THE LOSS OF 
THE FUNCTION TO "VENT" WILL LEAD TO THE INABILITY TO DEPRESSURIZE 
THE AIRLOCK. 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5066 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1631-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5066 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-679 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5067 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2026-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5067 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CNTRL. SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N / ] [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT 
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE 
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF 
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA FMEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL 
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS. 






















ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5068 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2026-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5068 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CNTRL. SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE ) 
1 1 1  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARXS: 
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT 
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE 
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF 
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA F'MEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL 
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-681 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5068A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2026-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5068 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CNTRL. SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
E l  
[ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ / ] - [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT 
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE 
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF 
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA FMEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL 
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5069 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2027-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5069 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. BUS SELECT SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N / J [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ / I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT 
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 
IOA COMMENT: THE LOSS OF THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE 
CONTROLS WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE IOA TO BE AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF 
MISSION, AS IT WAS FOR THE NASA FMEA, BUT A NON-MISSION ESSENTIAL 
EFFECT FOR THE FIRST FAILURE IN THE IOA ANALYSIS. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-683 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5070 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2027-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 




SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5070 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. BUS SELECT SWITCH (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 3 /1R 1 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 



































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5071 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2005-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5071 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CIRCUIT BREAKER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 [ I  [ N l  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  NAI [ P I  [ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-685 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5072 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2005-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5072 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CIRCUIT BREAKER (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  r 1  [ I  r I *  
IOA [ 3 /2R 3 [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N 3 C N I  C N I  I N 1  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
IOA COMMENT: WITH THE LOSS OF THE CIRCUIT BREAKER A CONDITION OF 
'IN0 MISSION EFFECT" OCCURS. HOWEVER, IF A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE 
OCCURS IN THE VACUUM VENT SUBSYSTEM THAN A HAZARDOUS ENVIROMENT 
OF HYDROGEN COULD BE PRODUCED, CREATING A CRITICALITY OF 3/1R. 
DUE TO THE LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY SUMMARY WAS 
AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL ASSESSMENT 
OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5073 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2032-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5073 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CONTROL DIODES (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  C J  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-687 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5073A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2032-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5073 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOL. VLV. CONTROL DIODES (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  1 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 







































. . . . .  
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5074 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2030-1 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5074 
ITEM: BUS ISOLATION DIODES (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 / 3  3 E l  [ I  [ I  I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/ DELETE ) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-689 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5075 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2030-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W C X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5075 
ITEM: BUS ISOLATION DIODES (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5076 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N EW[ 1 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5076 
ITEM: BUS SELECT SENSOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E l  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-691 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5077 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2033-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5077 
ITEM: CONTROL VALVE SWITCH INDICATOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  C l  
IOA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  
[ I *  
E l  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: IS-5077A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2033-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ J 
N W C X I  
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5077 
ITEM: CONTROL VALVE SWITCH INDICATOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 J C l  C l  1 3  C I *  
C l  [ I  [ I  C l  
COMPARE [ / J [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 J 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 3  
(ADD/DELETE) 
1 3 / 3  1 [ I  1 1  I 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-693 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5078 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2033-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5078 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT BARBER POLE INDICATOR (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5078A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2033-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5078 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT BARBER POLE INDICATOR (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-695 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5079 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2045-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5079 
ITEM: ISOL. VALVE SWITCH SENSOR RESISTOR (A8R5 AND 
A8R6) (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  c I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  1 1  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / 3 1 1  C l  [ I  I 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 3 / 3  1 1’ 1 [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5080 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2043-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5080 
ITEM: BUS SELECT SWITCH SENSOR RESISTORS (A8R1 AND 
A8R2) (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ / ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
r I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-697 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5081 
NASA FMEA t: 05-6VC-2044-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X 3 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5081 
ITEM: ISOL. VALVE SENSOR POWER RESISTOR (A8R3 C 4) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  I 1  [ I  I 1  
COMPARE [ / 3 C l  C I  C l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
t 3 / 3  1 I 1  I 1  [ I  I 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THE INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC RESISTOR VALUES ARE IN ERROR. THE VALUE 
SHOULD BE 1.2K OHM, INSTEAD OF THE 5.1K OHM SHOWN FOR THE 
SCHEMATIC. DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY 
SUMMARY WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL 
ASSESSMENT OF THIS ITEM WAS ATTEMPTED. 



























ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5081A 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6VC-2044-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5081 
ITEM: ISOL. VALVE SENSOR POWER RESISTOR (A8R3 & 4) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
CIL 
ITEM 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ F l  [ P I  [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THE INTEGRATED SCHEMATIC RESISTOR VALUES ARE IN ERROR. THE VALUE 
SHOULD BE 1.2K OHM, INSTEAD OF THE 5.1K OHM SHOWN FOR THE 
SCHEMATIC. DUE TO LIMITED NASA FMEA DATA (ONLY A CRITICALITY 
SUMMARY WAS AVAILABLE FOR THE POST 51-L NASA ANALYSIS), NO DETAIL 




REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-699 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 








3/ 08/ 8 8 
LS-5082 
NASA DATA: 




DEDICATED SIGNAL CONDITIONER (83V75A18) 
R.E.  DUFFY 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA I / 1 [ I  I 1  [ I  1 I *  
IOA [ 3 / 3  3 C I  [ I  I 1  C I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 C l  [ I  [ I  C l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  C I  1 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5083 
NASA FMEA #: 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ 1 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5083 
ITEM: DEDICATED SIGNAL CONDITIONER (83V75A16) 
LEAD ANALYST: R.E. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ I *  
[ I  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
THERE WAS NO NASA ALSS FMEA WHICH MATCHED THE IOA DESCRIPTION. 
THE NASA ANALYSIS MAY BE COMBINED WITH SOME OTHER HARDWARE OR 
REALLOCATED TO ANOTHER SUBSYSTEM. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-701 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5085X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2012-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5085 
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY STATUS INDICATOR (2) 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  I 1  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ N l  C N I  C N I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
(SHORTS TO GROUND) 
WITH LINE SHORTED TO GROUND, AS THE SWITCH IS MADE, THE BREAKER 
WILL OPEN DUE TO HIGH DEMAND AND THE VALVE WILL NOT ACTUATE. EMU 
SUIT CAN NOT BE SERVICED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION. FURTHER 
ASSESSMENT CANNOT BE MADE DUE TO LACK OF NASA FMEA DATA. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5086X 
NASA FMEA #: 05-6UA-2013-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X J 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5086 
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER STATUS INDICATOR 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 J [ I  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N J C N I  [ N l  [ N l  
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ J 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
(SHORTS TO GROUND) 
WITH THE LINE SHORTED TO GROUND, AS THE SWITCH IS MADE, THE 
BREAKER W I L L  OPEN DUE TO HIGH DEMAND, AND THE VALVE WILL NOT 
ACTUATE. EMU SUIT CANNOT BE SERVICED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION. 
FURTHER ASSESSMENT CANNOT BE MADE DUE TO LACK IF NASA FMEA DATA. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-703 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5087X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1208-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W I X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5087 
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY LINES h FITTINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 ] E l  [ I  1 3  
COMPARE [ N /N ] I N 1  I N 1  I N 1  
CIL 
ITEM 
1 I *  
1 x 1  
I N 1  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
1 2 1 2  1 1 3  I 1  [ I  [ A I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS: 
(RESTRICTED FLOW) 
FUNCTIONAL LOSS LEADS TO INABILITY TO SERVICE THE EMU'S. 
HOWEVER, THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM. ASSUMING AN 
EMERGENCY EVA LOSS DUE TO THIS FAILURE IS NOT CORRECT BECAUSE THE 
LATTER IS A SECOND FAILURE WHICH VIOLATES SPECIFICATION NSTS 
22206. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5088X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1402-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUEBY STEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5088 
ITEM: LCG SUPPLY & RETURN, LINES & FITTINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/F”C A B C 
NASA ( 2 /1R 3 [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /2  ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ /N ] [ N l  [ N l  [ N l  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS : 
(EXTERNAL LEAK) 
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM FUNCTION. ASSUMING A 
TWO MAN CREW (BASELINE MISSION), RECOVERY CANNOT BE PERFORMED 
SINCE EACH SCU CONNECTION HAS NO REDUNDANCY AND SHARING ONE SCU 
WOULD BE CREW ACTION WHICH IS AGAINST SPEC NSTS 22206. 
THE AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM. FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION 
SEE ASSESSMENT #5003. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-705 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5089X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1402-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
W E W I X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5089 
ITEM: LCG SUPPLY C RETURN, LINES 61 FITTINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
E A 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
c 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
(RESTRICTED FLOW) 
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM FUNCTION. ASSUMING A 
TWO MAN CREW (BASELINE MISSION), RECOVERY CANNOT BE PERFORMED 
SINCE EACH SCU CONNECTION HAS NO REDUNDANCY AND SHARING ONE SCU 
WOULD BE CREW ACTION WHICH IS AGAINST SPEC NSTS 22206. THE 
AIRLOCK IS NOT AN EMERGENCY ITEM. FOR FURTHER CLARIFICATION SEE 
ASSESSMENT #5003. 










































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-509OX 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1209-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5090 
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER LINE & FITTINGS 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /2R ] [ P I  [ NAI [ P I  [ I *  
IOA [ 2 /2 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ A I  
( ADD/DELETE ) 
1 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
(RESTRICTED FLOW) 
ASSUMING A TWO MAN CREW, THE FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF MISSION SINCE 
THERE IS NO REDUNDANCY FOR EACH C R E W " .  
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-707 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5091X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1205-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W C X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5091 
ITEM: 02 QUICK .COUPLINGS (NOT USED FOR SCU) AND CAP 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I 1  
(ADD/DELETE) 
[ 3 / 3  1 1 1  1 1  I 1  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
(INABILITY TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE) 
THE HARDWARE ITEMS TO PREVENT LEAKS ARE THE VALVE, COUPLING AND 
CAP. FUNCTIONALLY THIS FAILURE IS NOT IMPORTANT SINCE BY 
DEFINITION THIS LEAK IS "INTERNAL1'. THUS THE CREW IS NOT EVEN 
AWARE OF THIS FAILURE. THAT IS, BY DEFINITION "INTERNAL LEAK" 
MEANS NOT ALL THE SEALS CAN FAIL (THIS WOULD BE EXTERNAL 
LEAKAGE). INABILITY TO CLOSE IS MOOT SINCE THE CAP WOULD NEVER 
BE TAKEN OFF DURING FLIGHT (CREW USES THE SCU). 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5092X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1205-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
N E W C X l  
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5092 
ITEM: 02 QUICK COUPLING AND CAP (NOT USED FOR SCU) 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 3 /3 ] C I  [ I  C I  c I *  
IOA [ /NA ] 1 1  [ I  C I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
I /NA 3 C I  [ I  [ I  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ 3 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
(INABILITY TO OPEN) 
THIS FAILURE IS MOOT SINCE THE COUPLINGS ARE NEVER USED DURING 
FLIGHT. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-709 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 
ASSESSMENT ID: 













CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN 
R. DUFFY 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
[ P I  C P I  C P I  
IOA [ 3 /3 ] C l  I 1  [ I  
NASA [ 3 /1R 3 
CIL 
ITEM 
I *  
C l  
[ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
C 3 / 3  3 r i  [ I  1 1  [ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
(DAMAGED ELEMENT, OPEN) 
THIS FAILURE IS QUESTIONABLE. LOSS OF FILTERATION DOES NOT CAUSE 
VALVE FAILURE. 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5094X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1124-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5094 
.ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT CAP 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ F l  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ /NA 3 [ I  [ I  [ I  [. 3 
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N l  [ N l  I N 1  [ N l  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
E /NA 3 1 3  [ I  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION 
REMARKS: 
(EXTERNAL LEAK) 
THIS FAILURE IS 
DURING A NORMAL 
RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
NOT REALISTIC SINCE THIS VALVES WOULD NOT BE USED 
MISSION. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-711 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5095X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1631-3 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5095 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE (1) 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 1 [ I  [ I  [ I  
IOA [ 2 /2  ] [ I  [ I  [ . I  
COMPARE [ N /N 3 [ I  1 3  [ I  
CIL 
ITEM 
[ X I *  
[ X I  
RECOMMENDATIONS : (If different from NASA) 
[ 2 / 2  1 [ I  [ I  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ ] 
REMARKS: 
(EXTERNAL LEAK) 
THE FAILURE IS QUESTIONABLE. PER NSTS 22206 THE LEAK CANNOT BE 
THROUGH THE PACKING IN THE VALVES PENETRATION. THE ONLY OTHER 
PLACES COULD BE THE CASING ITSELF WHICH IS UNREALISTIC OR THE 0- 
RING WHICH SEALS THE VALVE TO THE BULKHEAD. THE O-RING 
(LACK OF) 
CONSUMMABLES FLOW. HOWEVER, ASSUMING CREW INABILITY TO CORRECT 
THE FAILURE LEADS TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF 
MISSION DUE TO AN UNCONTROLLABL 
IS NOT BIG ENOUGH TO DRAIN THE CABIN FASTER THAN 









































ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5096X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1630-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
NEW [ X ] 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5096 
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS, 2 INCH DEPRESSURIZATION 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 1 /1 ] [ I  [ I  [ I  [ X I *  
IOA [ 2 /1R ] [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I  
COMPARE [ N /N ] [ N I  [ N I  [ N I  [ I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS: 
(EXTERNAL LEAKAGE) 
THE LEAK CAN BE CONTROLLED WITH THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE. 
LOSS OF FUNCTION CREATES A LEAK IN THE CABIN WITH POTENTIAL LOSS 
OF LIFE/VEHICLE. EVEN THOUGH THE VACUUM ISOLATION VALVE HAS A 
DRAIN ORIFICE, THERE IS A POTENTIAL BUILD UP OF H2 IF THE 
LEAK IS DOWNSTREAM OF THE INTERFACE, WHICH ALSO HAS THE POTENTIAL 
FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE IF H2 IGNITES. THUS, MISSION IS 
TERMINATED ON FIRST FAILURE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-713 
APPENDIX C 
ASSESSMENT WORKSHEET 
ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5097X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1630-2 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ 3 
N E W [ X l  
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5097 
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS, 2 INCH DEPRESSURIZATION 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY 
ASSESSMENT : 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS CIL 
FLIGHT ITEM 
HDW/FUNC A B C 
NASA [ 2 /1R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  [ X I *  
IOA [ /NA ] [ I  1 3  [ I  [ I  
COMPARE [ N /N J C N I  C N I  C N I  C N I  
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
[ I  
( ADD/DELETE) 
[ /NA 1 [ I  1 3  [ I  
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ 3 
REMARKS:. 
(RESTRICTED FLOW) 
NO CRITICALITY HAS BEEN ASSIGNED BECAUSE THIS FAILURE IS NOT 
CREDIBLE. THE LINE IS 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER AND WOULD REQUIRE 
LARGE SIZE DEBRIS FOR EFFECTIVE PLUGGING. ON THE OTHER HAND, 
HYDROGEN IS A VERY LIGHT MOLECULE AND CAN PERMEATE THROUGH ANY 
SIZE CRACK. IF IOA HAD TO ASSIGN A CRITICALITY, IT WOULD BE A 

















ASSESSMENT DATE: 3/08/88 
ASSESSMENT ID: LS-5098X 
NASA FMEA #: 06-1-1128-1 
NASA DATA: 
BASELINE [ ] 
NEW f 1 
SUBSYSTEM : LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5098 
ITEM: AIRLOCK DEPRESSURIZATION CAP 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN 
ASSESSMENT: 
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY SCREENS 
FLIGHT 
HDW/F"C A B C 
NASA [ 3 /1R J [ P I  [ P I  [ P I  
IOA [ 2 /2 1 I 1  I 1  I 1  
[ N l  I N 1  I N 1  COMPARE [ N /N ] 
RECOMMENDATIONS: (If different from NASA) 
CIL 
ITEM 
I I *  
I X 1  
I N 1  
I 2 / 2  I I 1  I 1  [ I  [ A I  
(ADD/ DELETE) 
* CIL RETENTION RATIONALE: (If applicable) 
ADEQUATE [ ] 
INADEQUATE [ J 
REMARKS: 
IOA/NASA FM: INABILITY TO REMOVE. 
IOA COMMENT: FUNCTIONAL LOSS IS LOSS OF MISSION AND THERE IS NO 
REDUNDANCY AVAILABLE. 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 C-715 



























































































VACUUM VENT LINE HEAT 
NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH 





EMU WATER SUPPLY CIRC 
EMU WATER SUPPLY SW 
EMU POWER/BATTERY 
EMU WATER SUPPLY SW 
EMU POWER/BATTERY 
EMU WASTE WATER SW 
EMU WASTE WATER SW 
EMU WATER SUPPLY STAT 
EMU WASTE WATER STAT 
CB-SMOKE DETN BAY 2A 
CB-SMOKE DETN L/R FLT 
CB-SMOKE DETN CABIN 












WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. 
TANK INLET VALVE CIRC 
NOZZLE HEATER CIRCUIT 
CIRCUIT BREAKER, WCS 
CIRCUIT BREAKER, WCS 
TANK INLET VALVE SW 
TANK INLET VALVE SW 
TANK INLET VALVE 
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. 
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. 
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. 
WASTE H20 DUMP ISOL. 
FAILURE MODE ----------------- 
SHORTED 
FAILS TO OPEN 






SHORTED, ONE CONT 







SHORT TO GROUND 














LOSS OF OUTPUT 
FAILS TO REMAIN 
FAILS TO REMAIN 
FAILS TO REMAIN 
FAILS TO REMAIN 
FAILS TO REMAIN 




























































































0 6 - 1 - 1 2 0 8 - 1  
06-1-1208-2 
06-1-1209-2 
0 6 - 1 - 1 2 1 2 - 1  
06-1-1402-1 
2 1 7 4  















2 2 2 0  




















5 0 3 2  
5025 











WASTE H 2 0  DUMP ISOL.  
WASTE H 2 0  DUMP ISOL.  
WASTE H 2 0  DUMP VALVE 
WASTE H 2 0  DUMP VALVE 
WASTE H 2 0  DUMP VALVE 
WASTE H 2 0  DUMP VALVE 
WASTE H 2 0  DUMP VALVE 
DUMP VALVE INDICATOR 
WASTE H 2 0  DUMP VALVE 
WASTE H 2 0  DUMP VALVE 
WASTE H 2 0  DUMP VALVE 
WASTE H 2 0  DUMP VALVE 
WASTE H 2 0  DUMP VALVE 
DUMP VALVE INDICATOR 
DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZ 
DUMP VALVE ENABLE/NOZ 
NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH 
NOZZLE HEATER SWITCH 
VACUUM VENT ISOL.  VLV 
VACUUM VENT ISOL.  VLV 
VACUUM VENT ISOL.  VLV 
DUMP VALVE INDICATOR 
DUMP ISOLATION VALVE 
DUMP ISOLATION VALVE 
WASTE H 2 0  DUMP ISOL.  
WASTE DUMP VALVE S W  
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT 
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT 
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT 
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT 
AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT 
DEPRESS VALVE ( 1 )  
DEPRESS VALVE/CAP 
CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREE 
CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREE 
AIRLOCK DEPRESSURIZAT 
DEPRESS CAP VENT ( 1 )  
DEPRESS VALVE/CAP ( 1 )  
EMU 0 2  SUPPLY VALVE 
EMU 0 2  SUPPLY VALVE 
EMU 0 2  SUPPLY VALVE 
02 QUICK COUPLINGS 
EMU 0 2  SUPPLY COUPLIN 
EMU WATER SUPPLY VLV 
EMU WATER SUPPLY VLV 
EMU WATER SUPPLY L I N E  
EMU WATER SUPPLY L I N E  
EMU WASTE WATER L I N E  
EMU WASTE WATER VALVE 





















F A I L S  TO REMAIN 
F A I L S  TO REMAIN 




F A I L S  SHORTED 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
F A I L S  TO CLOSE 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
EXTERNAL LEAK 




I N A B I L I T Y  TO REM0 
F A I L S  TO OPEN 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
F A I L S  TO OPEN 
F A I L S  TO CLOSE 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
I N A B I L I T Y  TO CLOS 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 





F A I L S  TO OPEN 
EXTERNAL LEAK 





































































































LCG SUPPLY & RETURN 
AIRLOCK TO CABIN EQUA 
AIRLOCK TO CABIN EQUA 
AIRLOCK TO CABIN EQUA 
AIRLOCK TO CABIN FILT 
AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT 
AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT 
AIRLOCK TO CABIN VENT 
AIRLOCK TO CABIN PRES 
AIRLOCK TO CABIN PRES 
LINES & FITTINGS 
LINES 61 FITTINGS 
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION 
VACUUM VENT ISOLATION 












WCS FAN/SEPARATOR SW 
WCS FAN/SEPARATOR SW 
WCS MODE SWITCH (1) 
WCS MODE SWITCH (1) 
WCS FAN/SEPARATOR SW 
WCS MODE SWITCH (1) 
WCS FAN/SEPARATOR REL 
WCS FAN/SEPARATOR REL 
COMMODE/LINER (1) 
COMMODE UPPER RING (1) 
DUAL CHECK VALVES (2) 
WASTE TANK 1 INLET VLV 
WASTE TANK N2 HYDROPH 
WASTE TANK 1 DRAIN VLV 
MANUAL VENT VALVE (1) 
EXTERNAL LINE AND FIT 
CREW MODULE INTERNAL 
DYNATUBE FITTING 
WASTE TANK 1 DUMP IS0 
WASTE TANK 1 DUMP IS0 
WASTE TANK 1 DUMP VLV 
WASTE TANK 1 DUMP VLV 
VACUUM VENT NOZZLE (1) 




FAILS TO OPEN 
FAILS TO CLOSE 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
FAILS TO CLOSE 
FAILS TO OPEN 





FAILS TO CLOSE 
FAILS TO REMAIN 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 





FAILS TO REMAIN 
OPEN (ELECTRICAL) 
SHORT 
























FAILS TO CLOSE 
RESTRICTED FLOW 
































































































































2 0 4 1  
2043 










DUMP NOZZLE HEATER ( 1 )  
DUMP NOZZLE RESISTOR 
DUMP LINE HEATER ( 2 )  
WASTE H20 DUMP HEATER 
HIGH CAPACITY FILTER 
VACUUM VENT LINE HEAT 
VACUUM VENT NOZZLE HE 
WASTE H20 DUMP NOZZLE 
WASTE H20 DUMP NOZZLE 
WASTE H20 DUMP LINE 
WASTE H20 DUMP LINE 
CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE 
CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE 
CONTINGENCY H20 CROSS 
GSE DRAIN QD AND PLUG 
WCS TO WWS QD (1) 
WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE 
WWS LINE, UNIONS 
ARS CONDENSATE SUPPLY 
WCS CHECK VALVE LINES 
WCS TO WWS QD ( 1 )  
WCS TO WWS LINE ( 1 )  
WCS TO WWS LINE ( 1 )  
WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE 
WWS LINE, UNIONS 
ARS CONDENSATE SUPPLY 
GSE FILL QD AND PLUG 
WASTE TANK 1 OUTLET 
WASTE TANK 1 OUTLET 
GSE DRAIN QD AND PLUG 
DUMP LINES, FITTINGS 
HIGH CAPACITY FILTER 
DUMP LINES, FITTINGS 
QD AND TP @ HIGH CAP. 
HOSE ASSEMBLY 
MUFFLER HOUSING INLET 
WCS TO WWS QD (1) 
WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE 
WCS TO WWS QD ( 1 )  
WCS TO WWS DYNATUBE 
DUAL CHECK VALVES ( 2 )  
TUBE, EMU EXTENSION 
TUBE, EMU EXTENSION 
EMU QD ( 1 )  
FAN/SEPARATOR MUFFLER 
MUFFLER HOUSING ASSEM 
MUFFLER HOUSING ASSEM 
WCS BYPASS SWITCH ( 2 )  
H2 SEPARATOR ( 2 )  















INABILITY TO MATE 















































































































H2 SEPARATORS (2) 
H2 SEPARATORS 
L I N E S  AND F I T T I N G S  
H2 SEPARATORS 
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSI 
FILTER, GN2-TANKS I N L  
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN 
CAP, GSE QD (2) 
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN 
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN 
QD, GSE FILL/DRAIN 
CAP, GSE QD (2) 
H2 SEPARATOR (2) 
MICROBIAL FILTER (1) 
MICROBIAL FILTER QUIC 
TANKS INLET ISOLATION 
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSI 
L I N E S  AND F I T T I N G S  
QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS 
R E L I E F  VALVE, 1-5 PSI 
R E L I E F  VALVE, 1.5 PSI 
RELIEF VALVE, 1.5 PSI 
L I N E S  AND F I T T I N G S  
QD, CONTINGENCY CROSS 
L I N E S  AND F I T T I N G S  
L I N E S  AND F I T T I N G S  
TANKS OUTLET I S O L .  
CROSSOVER VALVE (1) 
I S O L  VALVE, FES B L I N  
DUMP I S O L  VALVE (1) 
L I N E S  AND F I T T I N G S  
SMOKE DETECTOR (9) 
SMOKE DETECTOR ( 9)  
SMOKE DETECTOR (9) 
FIRE SUPPRESSANT ASSE 
NASA STANDARD I N I T I A T  






F A I L S  TO OPEN 
STRUCTURAL FAILUR 
F A I L S  TO CLOSE 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
INTERNAL LEAKAGE 









F A I L S  TO REMAIN 
F A I L S  TO OPEN 
F A I L S  TO CLOSE 
F A I L S  TO OPEN 
EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 












F A I L S  TO F I R E  










































This appendix contains the IOA analysis worksAAeets supplementing 
previous results reported in STSEOS Working Paper 1.0-WP-VA87001- 
02, Analysis of the LSS and ALSS, (02 November 1987). Prior results 
were obtained independently and documented before starting the 
I?MEA/CIL assessment activity. 
performed to address failure modes not previously considered by 
the IOA. Each sheet identifies the hardware item being analyzed, 
parent assembly and function performed. 
possible causes are identified, and hardware and functional 
criticality for each mission phase are determined as described in 
NSTS 22206, Instructions for Pr eDarat ion of FME A and CIL, &Q 
October 1986. Failure mode effects are described at the bottom 
of each sheet and worst case criticality is identified at the 
Supplemental analysis was 
For each failure mode 
top . 
LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS .................................. 
Hardware Criticalities: 
1 = Loss of life or vehicle 
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item 
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle 
3 = All others 
Functional Criticalities: 
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which, 
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which, 
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle. 
if failed, could cause loss of mission. 
Redundancy Screen A: 
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight 
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight 
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight 
NA = Not Applicable 
P = Passed Screen 
F = Failed Screen 
NA = Not Applicable 
Redundancy Screens B and C: 
E-1 
E . l  









































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/28/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1250 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT: 3/2R 
ITEM: FILTER, TANKS N2 INLET (4) 
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J.t SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM 
3) TANK ASSEMBLY 
4 )  
5 )  





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/2R 
TAL: 3/2R LIFTOFF: 3/2R 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 3/2R 
DEORBIT : 3/2R AT0 : 3/2R 
PRELAUNCH : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 





CONTINUOUS FLOW OF N2 INTO THE CABIN DISTURBING 02/N2 CONTROL ON 
THE ARPCS. EVENTUALLY THE CABIN WILL BE N2-RICH, DEPRIVED OF 02, 
SINCE THE 14.7 PSIA REGULATORS WILL NOT OPEN TO FLOW 02. N2 
PRESSURIZATION TO TANKS IS TO BE DISCONTINUED AND TANKS 
PLACED ON CABIN PRESSURE AS BACK-UP. LOSS OF FUNCTION (LOSS OF 
TANK PRESSURE) IS LOSS OF EXPELLING WATER THRU DUMP OR FES. LOSS 
OF THIS FUNCTION (NOT ABLE TO PRESS TANKS) WILL FORCE TERMINATION 
OF MISSION, SINCE THE PPO2 IN THE CABIN CANNOT BE 
MAINTAINED AUTOMATICALLY. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 0 3/ 1 O/  8 8 E-3 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/28/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1251 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT: 3/ 1R 
ITEM: LINES/FITTINGS AND QD, FCP ALTERNATE LINE 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM 
3) TANK ASSEMBLY 
4) 
5) 





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: LIFTOFF : 3/1R 
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/1R AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 











LOSS OF BACK-UP LINE TO DELIVER FCP WATER TO TANKS. PRIMARY LINE 
IS AVAILABLE WITH H2 REMOVAL CAPABILITY. LOSS OF FUNCTION TO 
REMOVE FCP WATER IS POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. 
REFERENCES : 







































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/2 8/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/1R 
MDAC ID: 1252 ABORT: 3/1R 
ITEM: LINES/FITTINGS AND QD, FCP ALTERNATE LINE 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM 
3) TANK ASSEMBLY 
4 )  
5) 
6 )  
7 )  
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/1R AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 











LOSS OF BACK-UP LINE TO DELIVER FCP WATER TO TANKS. PRIMARY LINE 
IS AVAILABLE WITH H2 REMOVAL CAPABILITY. LOSS OF FUNCTION TO 
REMOVE FCP WATER IS POTENTIAL LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. 
~ 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-5 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/28/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1253 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT: 3/2R 
ITEM: LINES/FITTINGS AND QD, FCP ALTERNATE LINE 
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M . J .  SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM 
3) TANK ASSEMBLY 
4 )  




9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F"C 
RTLS : 3/2R 
TAL: 3/2R LIFTOFF: 3/2R 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 3/2R 
DEORBIT : 3/2R AT0 : 3/2R 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 





LOSS OF ALTERNATE FCP LINE TO FLOW WATER TO THE TANKS. PRIMARY 
LINE IS AVAILABLE WITH H2 REMOVAL CAPABILITY. LOSS OF FUNCTION 
TO CARRY WATER TO THE TANKS WITH THIS FAILURE RESULTS IN FLOW OF 
CONTINUOUS WATER INTO THE AREA, AND LOSS OF WATER REPLENISH 
THE TANK. MISSION IS LOST, SINCE THE FCPs ARE STILL DRAINED. 
REFERENCES : 







































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/28/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1254 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT: 3/2R 
ITEM: LINES/FITTINGS AND QD, FCP ALTERNATE LINE 
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM 
3) TANK ASSEMBLY 
4 )  
5) 
6 )  




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/2R 
TAL: 3/2R LIFTOFF : 3/2R 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 3/2R 
DEORBIT : . 3/2R AT0 : 3/2R 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 





LOSS OF ALTERNATE FCP LINE TO FLOW WATER TO THE TANKS. PRIMARY 
LINE IS AVAILABLE WITH H2 REMOVAL CAPABILITY. LOSS OF FUNCTION 
TO CARRY WATER TO THE TANKS WITH THIS FAILURE RESULTS IN FLOW OF 
CONTINUOUS WATER INTO THE AREA, AND LOSS OF WATER REPLENISH 
THE TANK. MISSION IS LOST, SINCE THE FCPs ARE STILL DRAINED. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-7 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/28/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1255 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 2/2 
ABORT: 2/2 
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS, H2 VENT 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM 
3) 
4 )  
5) 





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/J?UNC 




AT0 : 2/2 
ONORBIT : 2/2 
DEORB'IT : 2/ 2 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 





LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO REMOVE H2 FROM THE WATER WILL POSE 
POTENTIAL MISSION IMPACT AS EXPLAINED IN MDAC-1100. HOWEVER, 
THIS FAILURE ALLOWS WATER TO FLOW TO THE TANKS, SO THAT LOSS OF 
FUNCTION WITH THIS FAILURE WILL NOT DEAD-HEAD THE FUEL CELLS. 
REFERENCES : 







































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/28/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1256 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS, A/L TO EMU 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M . J .  SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM 
3) 
4 )  
5) 
6 )  
7 )  
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 





LOSS OF FUNCTION TO SUPPORT EVA/EMU ACTIVITIES, OTHERWISE NO 
SIGNIFICANT EFFECT. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-9 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/28/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1257 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/F”C 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS, A/L TO EMU 
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM 
3) 
4 )  
5 )  
6 )  
7) 
8 )  
9)  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F”C ABORT HDW/F”C 




LIFTOFF : 3/3 
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/2R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 





CONTINUOUS FLOW OF WATER TO THE CABIN UNLESS THE TANKS B OUTLET 
VALVE IS CLOSED. TANK A OUTLET VALVE AND THE X-OVER VALVE ARE 
OPERATIONALLY CLOSED. LOSS OF FES A, AND PRIMARY DUMP 
CAPABILITY. ONLY TWO TANKS REMAINING - MISSION IMPACT. 
REFERENCES : 




















INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1258 
1/ 12/ 8 8 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT : 3/2R 
ITEM: SWITCH, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM 
3) TANK ASSEMBLY 
4) EPDC 
5) 
6 )  




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F"C 
RTLS : 3/2R 
TAL: 3/2R LIFTOFF: 3/2R 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 3/2R 
DEORBIT : 3/2R AT0 : 3/2R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [ P l  C E P I  
LOCATION: PNL R12A2 - CABIN 
PART NUMBER: S4, 10, 15 AND 7 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THIS FAILURE MODE (PHYSICALLY JAMMED IN CLOSED POSITION) WILL 
PREVENT OPENING OF THE OUTLET ISOL VALVE TO ALLOW FLOW OF WATER 
FROM THE AFFECTED TANK - THAT IS LOSS OF ONE TANK FROM WATER 
MANAGEMENT SCENARIO. FUNCTIONAL LOSS OF REDUNDANT ITEMS WILL 
HAVE SAME EFFECTS AS MDAC-1112. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-11 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/12/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1259 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT : 3/2R 
ITEM: SWITCH, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED, SINGLE CONTACT 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM 
3) TANK ASSEMBLY 
4) EPDC 
5 )  
6 )  




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: LIFTOFF : 3/2R 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/2R AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B I P I  
LOCATION : PNL R12A2 - CABIN 
PART NUMBER: S4, 10, 15 AND 7 









A SHORT ACROSS "CLOSE" CONTACTS IS PERCEIVED TO BE MORE SEVERE 
THAN ACROSS "OPEN" CONTACTS. IN THIS CASE, THE AFFECTED TANK 
WILL BE ISOLATED FROM GENERATED WATER LINE AND THE EFFECT IS SAME 
AS EXPLAINED FOR INLET VALVE FAILED CLOSED, MDAC-1112. I 
REFERENCES : 




















INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/ 12/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 1260 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT : 3/3 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: SWITCH, OUTLET ISOL VALVE (4) 
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SINGLE CONTACT 
LEAD ANALYST: M.J. SAIIDI SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) SUPPLY WATER SUBSYSTEM 
3) TANK ASSEMBLY 
4) EPDC 
5 )  
6) 




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/F"C 
RTIS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
AT0 : 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
L?iNDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B I  1 c c  1 
LOCATION: PNL R12A2 - CABIN 
PART NUMBER: S4, 10, 15 AND 7 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
A SINGLE CONTACT OPEN ACROSS "OPEN" PINS WILL PREVENT OPENING OF 
THE ISOL VALVE THEREFORE ISOLATING THE AFFECTED TANK FROM 
GENERATED WATER LINE - SEE MDAC-1112. HOWEVER, THE VALVES ARE 
ALL CONFIGURED TO OPEN POSITION THROUGHOUT MISSION, AND NO CREW 
ACTION IS ANTICIPATED TO CLOSE THEM. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-13 
E . 2  
WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS 







































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2225 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT: /NA 
ITEM: FIXED FILTER URINAL SCREEN (2) 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY 
5) 
6 )  
7) 
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : /NA 
TAL: /NA 
AOA: /NA 
LIFTOFF : /NA 
DEORBIT : /NA AT0 : /NA 
ONORBIT : 3/2R 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA 1 C [ P I  




THE BLOCKAGE IS READILY DETECTABLE AND REQUIRES USE OF ALTERNATE 
URINE COLLECTION HOSE. IF SECOND PATH FAILS THEN A MISSION LOSS 
IS A POTENTIAL IF THERE IS NOT SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES OF FCB AND UCD 
FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE MISSION. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-15 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
MDAC ID: 2226 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: EMU QD (1) 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K .  BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COUECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) URINE/WASTE FLUID COLLECTION ASSEMBLY 
5) 
6) 




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/FUNC 





DEORBIT : /NA AT0 : /NA 
ONORBIT : 3/2R 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B CNA 1 C [ P I  
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 [G.E. DWG. 238B5134GlI 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
FUNGUS/BACTERIAL GROWTH 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
WITH LOSS OF QD FLOW A "WORK-AROUND" HAS BEEN DEVELOPED AS AN IFM 
TO DUMP INTO A CWC, HOWEVER IF THE REDUNDANT PATH FAILS A MISSION 
LOSS WOULD BE DEVELOPED. 
REFERENCES : 







































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2227 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT: /NA 
ITEM: COMMODE LINER 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 











I WDOWN HIERARCHY: 
I LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
I WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
I WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
I FECAL/EMISIS COLLECTION ASSEMBLY 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA 
TAL: /NA 
AOA: /NA 
LIFTOFF : /NA 
DEORBIT : /NA AT0 : /NA 
ONORBIT : 3/2R 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA 1 C [ P l  
LOCATION : ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 [G.E. DWG. 63E9~05763G21 
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, CHEMICAL REACTION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW OF THE COMMODE LINER CREATES A 
MISSION LOSS SCENARIO IF THE FCB AND UCDs ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY 
SUPPLIED TO COMPLETE THE MISSION, OTHERWISE THE FCB AND UCDs ARE 
REDUNDANT COLLECTION METHODS. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-17 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2228 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I FLIGHT: 3/2R ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: COMMODE LINER 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) FECAL/EMISIS COLLECTION ASSEMBLY 






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 
DEORBIT : /NA AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA 1 
LOCATION : ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 [G.E. DWG. 633905763623 
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, CHEMICAL REACTION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW OF THE COMMODE LINER CREATES A 
MISSION LOSS SCENARIO IF THE FCB AND UCDs ARE NOT SUFFICIENTLY 
SUPPLIED TO COMPLETE THE MISSION, OTHERWISE THE FCB AND UCDs ARE 
REDUNDANT COLLECTION METHODS. 
REFERENCES : 



































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2229 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: AUXILIARY TRASH VENT ORIFICE (1) 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION 
5 )  
6 )  




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/FUNC 





LIFTOFF : 3/3 
ONORBIT: 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ J B [  1 C [  1 
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW CAUSES NO PROBLEMS EXCEPT ODOR 
BUILDUP IN THE AUXILIARY WET TRASH AREA. 
REFERENCES: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-19 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE: 12/ 03/8 7 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2230 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: WET TRASH VENT LINE ORIFICE (1) 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M . J .  SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION 
5 )  
6) 




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F”C ABORT HDW/FUNC 




ONORBIT : 3/3 AOA: 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [  1 C [  I 
LOCATION : ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW OUT OF THE WET TRASH AREA IS OF NO 
EFFORT TO MISSION OR VEHICLE, EXCEPT POSSIBLE NOXIOUS GAS BUILD- 
UP IN THE WET TRASH CONTAINER. 
REFERENCES : 







































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2231 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: /NA 
/NA ABORT : 
ITEM: WET TRASH VENT LINE ORIFICE (1) 
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION 
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 




ONORBIT : /NA AOA: /NA 
DEORBIT : /NA AT0 : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ J B [  1 C [  1 
LOCATION : ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 
CAUSES : 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
VIEWED AS A NON-CREDIBLE FAILURE - SEE VALVE HOUSING (MDAC ID 
2048 AND 2051) FOR EXTERNAL LEAKAGE. 
REFERENCES : 




INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/2 
MDAC ID: 2232 ABORT: /NA 
ITEM: WCS CHECK VALVE LINES TO WWS QD 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION 
5 )  





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 






DEORBIT : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C  1 
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90 












THE LOSS OF THIS LINE RESTRICTS THE WCS USAGE AND THUS RESTRICTS 
WASTE COLLECTION TO FCB AND UCDs WHICH WAS DEFINED AS A MISSION 
LOSS BECAUSE THERE MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES ON-BOARD TO 
COMPLETE THE MISSION TIME-LINE. 
I REFERENCES : 




















INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2233 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT : 3/2R 
ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: WCS CHECK VALVE LINES TO WWS QD 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION 
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA 
TAL: /NA 
AOA: /NA 
LIFTOFF : /NA 
DEORBIT : /NA ATO: /NA 
ONORBIT: 3/2R 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA 1 C E P I  
LOCATION : ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FUNGUS/BACTERIAL GROWTH 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE LOSS OF THIS LINE RESTRICTS THE WCS USAGE AND THUS RESTRICTS 
WASTE COLLECTION TO FCB AND UCDs WHICH WAS DEFINED AS A POTENTIAL 
MISSION LOSS BECAUSE THERE MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES ON- 
BOARD TO COMPLETE THE MISSION TIME-LINE. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-23 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2234 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I FLIGHT: 3/2R ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: COMMODE RE-PRESSURIZATION VALVE ORIFICE (1) 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTAUATION 
5) VALVE ASSEMBLY 
6) 
7) 
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 




REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B CNA 1 
LOCATION : ECLSS AREA 90 








CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BACTERIAL/F"GUS GROWTH I 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
WHEN THE ORIFICE IS PLUGGED, THE COMMODE CANNOT BE REPRESSURIZED 
AT THE NORMAL RATE, BUT THE COMMODE CAN STILL BE ACCESSED. IF 
THE SECONDARY REPRESSURIZATION LINE IS ALSO BLOCKED THEN WCS 
USAGE FAILS EXCEPT FOR FCB AND UCDs WHICH COULD NECESSITATE 
A MISSION LOSS DUE TO POTENTIAL OF INSUFFICIENT FCB AND UCD 
SUPPLIES TO COMPLETE THE MISSION. 
I 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-24 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R 
MDAC ID: 2235 ABORT: /NA 
ITEM: HOSE ASSEMBLY, FAN/SEPARATOR TO CV (2) 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION 
5) FAN/SEPARATOR 
6 )  




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 
DEORBIT : /NA ATO: 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
PRELAUNCH : /NA 
LIFTOFF : /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [NA 1 
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, 
BACTERIAL/FUNGUS GROWTH 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE RESTRICTED FLOW CAUSES SWITCHING OVER TO THE BACKUP 
FAN/SEPARATOR. IF THE SECOND FAN/SEPARATOR FAILS A POTENTIAL 
LOSS OF MISSION DEVELOPS IF THE FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES ARE NOT 
SUFFICIENT TO COMPLETE THE MISSION. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-25 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R 
MDAC ID: 2236 ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR MUFFLER HOUSING INLET DUCT 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION 
5) FAN/SEPARATOR 
6) 
7 )  
8 )  
9)  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
ONORBIT : 3/2R AOA: 




REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA 1 
LOCATION : ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, 
CHEMICAL REACTION, BACTERIAL/FUNGUS GROWTH 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF FILTERED OUTPUT WILL CAUSE FLOODING OF THE FAN/SEPARATORS 
AND LOSS OF WCS FUNCTION. THE LOSS OF WCS FUNCTION PRODUCES A 
LOSS OF MISSION CONDITION IF THE LIMITED FECAL AND URINE 
COLLECTION DEVICES ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO COMPLETE THE MISSION. 
REFERENCES : 




















INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT : 3/2R 
MDAC ID: 2237 ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: MUFFLER HOUSING ASSEMBLY (1) 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED AND BLOCKED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION 
5) FAN/SEPARATOR 





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: ONORBIT : 3/2R 
DEORBIT : /NA AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
LIFTOFF: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B ENA I 
LOCATION : ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 [G.E. DWG 473232908G41 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, BACTERIAL/F'UNGUS 
GROWTH 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE LOSS OF THE MUFFLER HOUSING FLOW ELIMINATES THE WCS USAGE. 
THE REDUNDANT SYSTEM CONSISTS OF THE FCB AND UCDs. IF THERE ARE 
NOT SUFFICIENT FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES FOR THE MISSION DURATION THEN 
A MISSION LOSS WOULD BE DEVELOPED. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-27 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2238 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I FLIGHT: 2/2 ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: MUFFLER HOUSING ASSEMBLY (1) 
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION 
5) FAN/SEPARATOR 





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 





ONORBIT : 2/2 
DEORBIT : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [  1 
LOCATION : ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 [G.E. DWG 47E232908641 
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE OF UNFILTERED WCS CONTROL AIR CREATES A 
HEALTH PROBLEM BY THE BACTERIA INVOLVED AND IS A MISSION HAZARD 
IF NOT DISCOVERED IN TIME. 
REFERENCES : 



































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
MDAC ID: 2239 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT : 3/2R 
ABORT: /NA 
ITEM: ODOR/BACTERIA FILTER (2) 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BAFtICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
WDOWN HIERARCHY: 
I LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
I WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
I WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
I LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION 
I FAN/SEPARATOR 
I MUFFLER HOUSING INSTALLATION 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 





DEORBIT : /NA AT0 : /NA 
ONORBIT : 3/2R 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [NA 1 C [ P I  
LOCATION : ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, HIGH PRESSURE, 
VIBRATION, BACTERIAL/FUNGUS GROWTH 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE LOSS OF ACTIVE FILTERING REQUIRES REPLACEMENT OF THE FILTER 
UNIT WITH THE 1 SPARE ITEM. THE PROCESS OF BLOCKED FLOW CAN ALSO 
CAUSE FLOODED FAN/SEPARATORS AND POTENTIAL BODY WASTE 
CONTAMINANTS INTO THE CABIN ATMOSPHERE. THE LOSS OF ALL ACTIVE 
FILTERING REQUIRES THE USE OF FCB AND UCDs WHICH IS CONSIDERED A 
LOSS OF MISSION EFFECT BECAUSE THERE IS A POTENTIAL OF DEPLETING 
THE ON-BOARD OF FCB AND UCD BEFORE MISSION COMPLETION. 
REFERENCES : 




INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3 
MDAC ID: 2240 ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: BALLAST VALVE SCREEN (1) 
FAILURE MODE: DAMAGED ELEMENT/OPEN 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICXMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M . J .  SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION 
5) BALLAST VALVE 
6 )  











ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B C  1 








PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 [G.E. DWG 199C311OP2] 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THIS IS A SECONDARY FILTER SCREEN: THE FAILURE CAUSES NO 
PROBLEMS. 
REFERENCES : 




















INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
MDAC ID: 2241 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT : 3/3 
ABORT: /NA 
ITEM: BALLAST SELECT VALVE (BALLAST VALVE ASSEMBLY) (1) 
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COUECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION 
5) BALLAST VALVE 
6) 
7) 
8 )  
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 






DEORBIT : /NA AT0 : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B I  3 c c  1 
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 [G.E. DWG 47C265767621 
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
NO PROBLEM EXCEPT POTENTIAL REDUCED AIR FLOW FROM WET TRASH AREA. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-31 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R 
MDAC ID: 2242 ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: BALLAST VALVE TO BALLAST CONTROL VALVE LINES AND 
FITTINGS (1) 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED OR BLOCKED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION 
5) 












DEORBIT : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
AT0 : 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B CNA 1 
I 
I LOCATION : ECLSS AREA 90 
I PART NUMBER: G.E. DWG 47C265767G2 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, 
BACTERIAL/F'UNGUS GROWTH 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE LOSS OF THIS LINE PROHIBITS THE STANDARD REPRESSURIZATION OF 
THE COMMODE OR THE BALLAST AIR FLOW FOR URINAL USAGE, THUS A LOSS 
OF WASTE COLLECTION METHODS. THE FCB AND UCDs CAN BE USED AS 
LONG AS THE SUPPLY LASTS, WHICH MAY NOT BE SUFFICIENT 
TO COMPLETE MISSION. 
REFERENCES : 







































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2243 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT: /NA 
ITEM: BALLAST VALVE TO BALLAST CONTROL VALVE LINES AND 
FITTINGS (1) 
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION 






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 





ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  I 
LOCATION : ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: G.E. DWG 47C265767G2 
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE CAUSES NO PROBLEM FOR MISSION LIFE OR 
OPERATIONS. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-33 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2244 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: THIGH BAR RESTRAINT (2) 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED, FAILS IN "IN-USE" POSITION 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARIC- SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) CREW RESTRAINT ASSEMBLY 
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH : /NA RTLS : /NA 
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA 
AOA: /NA 
AT0 : /NA 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B I  3 C [  3 
LOCATION : ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: G.E. DWG 63390573661 
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE THIGH BAR WOULD FAIL IN THE "IN-USE" POSITION IF THE CREW 
MEMBER FORCED THE BAR INTO PLACE, THUS BENDING IT OUT OF SHAPE. 
THIS FAILURE HAS OCCURED ON SEVERAL FLIGHTS AND IS REMEDIED BY 
SIMPLY BENDING BACK INTO SHAPE. THIS IS AN ITEM FOR POTENTIAL 
MODIFICATIONS IN DESIGN TO ELIMINATE THE PROBLEM. 
REFERENCES : 







































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2245 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT: /NA 
ITEM: WCS BYPASS SWITCH (2) 
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED TO GROUND 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAXDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4 ) .  ELECTRICAL PARTS 
5 )  
6 )  
7) 
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: ONORBIT : 3/2R 
DEORBIT : /NA AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
LIFTOFF: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [NA 1 
LOCATION : ECLSS AREA 90 
PART "MBER: WCS 80V62A14 (SWITCH S6 AND S7) 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE FAILURE OF THE SWITCH BY SHORTING TO GROUND CAUSES THE 
ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER "TRIP" AND THE OFF-LINE REDUNDANT 
FAN/SEPARATOR NEEDS TO BE ACTUATED. IF THE SECOND FAN/SEPARATOR 
FAILS THEN THE FCB AND UCDs MUST BE USED FOR CREW WASTE 
COLLECTION. IF THERE ARE NOT SUFFICIENT FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES A 
MISSION LOSS IS DEVELOPED. 
REFERENCES : 





INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R 
MDAC ID: 2246 ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: WASTE TANK INLET LINES AND FITTINGS (1) 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM 
4) STORAGE ASSEMBLY 
5 )  
6) 




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: ONORBIT : 3/ 1R 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [NA 1 
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: V62Q0540A 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
VIBRATION, BACTERIAL/FUNGUS GROWTH 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
BLOCKED FLOW ELIMINATES THE WASTE STORAGE TANK USAGE AND ALL 
WASTE FLUIDS MUST BE DUMPED INTO EITHER A CWC OR DIRECTLY 




































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2247 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: WASTE TANK OUTLET LINES AND FITTINGS 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM 
4) 
5 )  





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : /NA 
TAL: /NA 
AOA: /NA 
AT0 : /NA 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF : /NA 
ONORBIT : /NA 
DEORBIT : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C  1 C [  1 
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: V62Q0540A 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, FUNGUS/BACTERIA GROWTH 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THIS FAILURE ONLY EFFECTS GROUND OPERATIONS AND IS NOT A MISSION 
IMPACT FAILURE. 
REFERENCES: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-37 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/2R 
MDAC ID: 2248 ABORT: /NA 
ITEM: HYDROPHOBIC FILTER (1) 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM 
4) STORAGE ASSEMBLY 
5 )  
6) 




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: ONORBIT : 3/2R 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
PRELAUNCH : /NA 
LIFTOFF: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA 1 
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: 90V62FL1 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, CHEMICAL REACTION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF THE FILTER IS A DETECTABLE FAILURE BECAUSE THE WASTE TANK 
MOTION WILL BE RESTRICTED DUE TO THE EXCESSIVE PRESSURE BUILDUP. 
THE WASTE/= FLUIDS MUST THEN BE DUMPED OVERBOARD OR INTO A CWC 
FOR LATER DISPOSAL. IF ALL COLLECTION/DUMP METHODS 
FAILS THEN THE FCB AND UCDs MUST BE USE. THE FCB AND UCB USAGE 
COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF MISSION IF THERE ARE NOT SUFFICIENT 
SUPPLIES FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE MISSION. 
REFERENCES : 








INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2249 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE QD AND PLUG (1) 
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM 
4) DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY 






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/FUNC 





DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/2R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F l  C [ P I  
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: 80V62TP103 (MC276-0020-1101) 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
VIBRATION, CHEMICAL REACTION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
WHEN THE QD LEAKS, THAT IS A "NO EFFECT" FAILURE THAT IS NOT 
DETECTABLE HOWEVER WHEN THE SEAL ON THE PLUG FAILS THEN BODY 
WASTES CAN LEAK INTO THE CREW CABIN THUS PRESENTING A HAZARD TO 
THE CREW AND LOSS OF MISSION SCENARIO. NEITHER OF THESE FAILURES 
IS DETECTABLE UNTIL THE SECOND ONE OCCURS. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-39 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
MDAC ID: 2250 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 2/1R 
ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE QD AND PLUG (1) 
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
I 
I 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
I BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM 







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F”C ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: ONORBIT: 2/ 1R 




REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P l  
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90 


















COLLECTION METHODS AND MUST USE FCB AND UCDs. THE EXTERNAL 
THE FIRST FAILURE LIMITS MISSION LIFE BECAUSE OF LOST WASTE 
LEAKAGE OF THE QD MEANS THAT IF THE CROSS-TIE NEEDS TO BE USED 
FOR THE SUPPLY WATER DUMP THEN THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF 
COOLING FLUIDS AND THUS LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE IF UNDETECTED. 
REFERENCES : 




















INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/ 0 3/ 8 7 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3/3 
MDAC ID: 2251 ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: WASTE DUMP VALVE SWITCH INDICATOR (1) 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M . J .  SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM 
4) ELECTRICAL PARTS 
5) DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY 












ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  1 
LOCATION : DtC PANEL ML31C, 80V73A127 
PART NUMBER: INDICATOR DS4 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE FAILURE OF THE INDICATOR IS NOT MISSION OR LIFE CRITICAL AS 
THERE ARE OTHER INDICATIONS OF VALVE STATUS AND EVEN IF ALL VALVE 
STATUS IS LOST WASTE DUMPS CAN STILL BE PERFORMED IF THE VALVE 
FUNCTION IS NOT LOST. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-4 1 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/ 1R 
/NA MDAC ID: 2252 ABORT: 
ITEM: WASTE DUMP VALVE SWITCH 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED, SHORT TO GROUND 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M . J .  SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM 
4) ELECXRICAL PARTS 
5) DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY 
6 )  




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
ONORBIT : 2/ 1R AOA: 




REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA 1 
LOCATION : D&C PANEL ML31C, 80V73A127 
PART NUMBER: INDICATOR DS4 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF INDICATOR BY GROUNDING WILL ELIMINATE THE WASTE WATER 
DUMP VALVE CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF TRIPPED CIRCUIT BREAKER AND THE 
SUPPLY WATER DUMP LINE MUST BE USED. UNLESS THE VALVE IS OPEN AT 
TIME OF FAILURE, IN WHICH CASE HAVE POTENTIAL FOR LOSS 
OF LIFE IF ANOTHER VALVE SEAL FAILS (2/1R PNP CRITICALITY). IF 
THE SUPPLY WATER DUMP BECOMES INOPERABLE THE FUEL CELLS COULD BE 
FLOODED, HENCE LOSS OF ORBITER POWER AND A LOSS OF LIFE CONDITION 
ARISES. 
REFERENCES : 







































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/03/87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2253 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: FAN/SEPARATOR INLET HOSE FROM COMMODE (2) 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED AND BLOCKED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAXDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: ONORBIT : 3/2R 
DEORBIT : /NA AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
LIFTOFF: /NA 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A ( 2 J B [NA 1 
LOCATION: ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: WCS 80V62A14 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE LOSS OF THE INLET LINE REQUIRES USE OF THE ALTERNATE 
FAN/SEPARATOR, IF THAT FAILS THEN THE FCB AND UCDs MUST BE USED. 
DEPENDING ON THE MISSION LOCATION OF THE FAN/SEPARATOR ASSEMBLY 
FAILURES THERE MAY NOT BE ENOUGH FCB AND UCD SUPPLIES FOR THE 
MISSION - THUS A MISSION LOSS SITUATION. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-43 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/ 11/ 87 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2254 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I FLIGHT: 3/2R ABORT: /NA 
I ITEM: SCREEN, DOWNSTREAM OF BALLAST/REPRESS SCREEN (1) FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
I 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M . J .  SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE COLLECTION SUBSYSTEM 
4) LIQUID AND AIR LINE INSTALLATION 
5) BALLAST VALVE 





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
RTLS : 
TAL: 
AOA: ONORBIT : 3/2R 




REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [NA 1 
LOCATION : ECLSS AREA 90 
PART NUMBER: WCS 90V62A14 [G.E. DWG 47D232872P31 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, BACTERIA/FUNGUS GROWTH 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
INSUFFICIENT AIRFLOW TO URINAL, EXCESSIVE DRAG ON FAN/SEPARATOR 
AND POTENTIAL FOR FLOODING FAN/SEPARATOR. IF FLOW IS BLOCKED, 
CANNOT USE URINAL OR COMMODE AND MUST USE FCB AND UCDs. IF FCB 
AND UCD SUPPLY IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR REMAINING MISSION LIFE, 
THEN A MISSION LOSS OCCURS. 
REFERENCES : 


































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 2255 
12/ 11/ 8 7 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/2R 
ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS, DUMP VALVE TO NOZZLE (1) 
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM 
4) DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY 
5) 
6 )  
7 )  
8 )  
9)  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 





DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/2R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B INA 1 C C P I  
LOCATION: MIDBODY AREA 40 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE EXTERNAL LEAK IN THE DUMP LINE IS A PROBLEM BECAUSE OF THE 
POTENTIAL FOR CONTAMINATION OF PAYLOADS DUE TO THE WASTE FLUIDS. 
REFERENCES : 




INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 12/11/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/E"C 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 3 /2R 
MDAC ID: 2256 ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: LINES AND FITTINGS, DUMP VALVE TO NOZZLE (1) 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED/BLOCKED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) WASTE MANAGEMENT SUBSYSTEM 
3) WASTE WATER SUBSYSTEM 
4) DUMP LINE ASSEMBLY 












ONORBIT : 3/2R 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA 1 




















THE LOSS OF THE EXTERNAL DUMP LINE FORCES THE USE OF THE 
CONTINGENCY CROSS-TIE QD AND SUPPLY WATER DUMP LINE. 
THE SUPPLY DUMP LINE WITH WASTE FLUIDS COULD PRODUCE A LOST 
MISSION IF ALL OF THE DUMP LINES ARE BLOCKED, IN WHICH CASE A 
LOSS OF MISSION WOULD BE GENERATED. 
THE USE OF 
REFERENCES : I 

























SMOKE DETECTION/FIRE SUPPRESSION SUBSYSTEM 
ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-47 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/06/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3112 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/F"C 
FLIGHT: 1/ 1 
ABORT : 1/ 1 I 
I ITEM: SWITCH-SMOKE DETECTOR SENSOR RESET (57) FAILURE MODE: SHORTED, SHORTS (POLE-TO-POLE), SHORTS (TO GROUND) 
SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
I 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) SMOKE DETECTION 
3) RESET 
4) SWITCH 
5 )  
6 )  
7) 
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 





PRELAUNCH: 1/ 1 
LIFTOFF: 1/ 1 
ONORBIT : 1/ 1 
DEORBIT : 1/ 1 
LANDING/SAFING: 1/1 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] 
LOCATION: PNL LlAl 
PART NUMBER: 31V73AlA1 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHA 
VIBRATION 
lICAL SHOCK, PIECE-P RT FAILURE, 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE FAILURE TIES TWO OR THREE MAIN BUSES TOGETHER WHICH MAY 
RESULT IN THE LOSS OF TWO OR FOUR SMOKE DETECTORS. IF THE 
FAILURE TIES THREE BUSES ONE BAY WILL HAVE NO SENSING REMAINING, 






































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/ 0 6/88 
SUBSYSTEM: L I F E  SUPPORT 
MDAC ID:  3114 
HIGHEST C R I T I C A L I T Y  HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3 / 1 R  
ABORT: 3 / 1 R  
ITEM: SW-SMOKE DETECTOR C I R C U I T  TEST ( S 8 )  
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED, SHORTED (POLE-TO-POLE), SHORT (TO GROUND) 
LEAD ANALYST: J . D .  ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M . J .  S A I I D I  
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1 )  L I F E  SUPPORT 
2 )  SMOKE DETECTION 
3 )  SWITCH 
4 )  
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8 )  
9 )  
C R I T I C A L I T I E S  
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: 3 / 1 R  RTLS : 3 / 1 R  
LIFTOFF:  3 / 1 R  TAL: 3 / 1 R  
ONORBIT : 3 / 1 R  AOA: 3/ 1 R  
DEORBIT : 3 / 1 R  AT0 : 3 / 1 R  
LANDING/SAFING: 3 / 1 R  
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 J B C P I  C [ P I  
LOCATION: PNL L l A l  
PART NUMBER: 3 1 V 7 3 A l A l  
CAUSES : 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE SMOKE DETECTOR STATUS ALARMS ARE CONTINUOSLY CONFIGERED I N  
THE T E S T  MODE WHICH DISABLES THE HARDWARE ALARM. REDUNDANT SMOKE 
CONCENTRATION FDA ALEARMS REMAIN I N  ALL AREAS. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-49 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 2/09/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3144 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT: 3/1R 
ITEM: SWITCH-FIRE SUPPRESSION AV BAY 1, 2, 3, -/SAFE 
(Sl,S2 ,S3) 
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION, PREMATURE OPERATION, FAILS 
CLOSED 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) FIRE SUPPRESSION 
3) SWITCH 
4 )  
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS : 3/1R 
LIFTOFF : 3/1R TAL: 3/1R 
ONORBIT : 3/ 1R AOA: 3/1R 
DEORBIT : 3/ 1R AT0 : 3/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 J B [ P l  C [ P l  
LOCATION: PNL LlAl 
PART NUMBER: 31V73AlAl 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
FAILURE OF COMPONENT RESULTS IN FIRE SUPPRESSANT PIC BEING ARMED. 
POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY OPENING ASSOCIATED CB. IF BREAKER FAILS 
CLOSED, PIC CANNOT BE DISARMED. A SUBSEQUENT FAILURE OF 
DISCHARGE SW OR PIC CAN DISCHARGE SUPPRESSANT & AFTER 
APPROXIMATELY 50 HRS THE CAPABILITY TO SUPRESS A FIRE DURING 
ENTRY IS LOST (PORTABLE BOTTLES CANNOT BE USED DURING THIS 
PHASE). IF BOTTLE IS DISCHARGED BEFORE LIFT-OFF TERMINATE 
MISSION, IF LIFT-OFF TAKES PLACE, SUPPRESSANT SHOULD PROVIDE 
PROTECTION UNTIL ORBIT OPERATIONS ARE ESTABLISHED. FOR DEORBIT A 
PORTABLE BOTTLE SHOULD BE DISCHARGED INTO AFFECTED BAY PRIOR TO 
DEORBIT BURN. THIS PROVIDES PROTECTION FOR APPROXIMATELY 24 
HOURS. FAILURE IS DETECTABLE THRU PIC CAPACITOR VOLTAGE 
MEASUREMENTS. 
REFERENCES : 




























INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/06/88 
MDAC ID: 3148 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 2/1R 
ABORT: 2/1R 
ITEM: SW-FIRE SUPPRESSION AV BAY 1, 2, 3 AGENT DISCH 
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION, PREMATURE OPERATION, 
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, FAILS CLOSED 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) FIRE SUPPRESSION 
3) SWITCH 
4) 
5 )  





FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F"C 
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS : 2/1R 
LIFTOFF : 2/1R TAL: 2/1R 
ONORBIT : 3/1R AOA: 2/1R 
DEORBIT : 2/1R AT0 : 2/ 1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B C P I  c r p 1  
LOCATION : PNL LlAl 
PART NUMBER: 31V73AlAl 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE FAILURE ENABLES THE FIRE SUPPRESSSANT CONTAINER *'FIRE*' 
COMMAND TO THE ASSOCIATED PIC. THIS FAILURE COUPLED WITH A 
FAILURE OF THE ONE SECOND TIME DELAY WILL INHIBIT THE DISCHARGE 
CAPABILITY OF THE CONTAINER. THE PORTABLE BOTTLES PROVIDE 
FURTHER PROTECTION ON ORBIT AND ON THE GROUND THUS THE 
CRITICALITY BECOMES 3/1R. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-51 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/ 09/ 8 8 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/1R 
MDAC ID: 3154 ABORT : 2/1R 
ITEM: DIODE-NO IDENTIFIER 
FAILURE MODE: SHORTED 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) FIRE SUPPRESSION 
3) GROUND CIRCUIT 
4) FIRE CIRCUIT 
5 )  




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH : 3/1R 
LIFTOFF: 2 /1R 
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R 
















C [ P I  
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLVC.Y, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THE- 
SHOCK, VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE FAILURE TIES THE FLIGHT FIRE SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER ARM 
CIRCUIT TO THE PRE-FLIGHT BUS THROUGH THE TYPE I11 HYBRID DRIVER. 
DURING LIFT-OFF AND DEORBIT, IF SUBSEQUENT FAILURES OCCUR WHICH 
ENABLE LOADS SUFFICIENT TO TRIP THE ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT BREAKER 
THE PIC CANNOT BE ARMED. ALSO, ONE OTHER FAILURE WITH IN THE 
DRIVER (SHORTED DIODE) CAN TIE THE CIRCUIT BREAKER TO GROUND. IN 
ALL OTHER MISSION PHASES THE PORTABLE BOTTLES PROVIDE A BACKUP. 
REFERENCES : 




















INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 2/15/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/1R 
MDAC ID: 3158 ABORT : 2/1R 
ITEM: SMOKE DETECTOR (9) 
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION, PREMATURE OPERATION 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) SMOKE DETECTION 
3) DETECTOR 
4 )  
5) 
6 )  




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: 2/1R RTLS : 
LIFTOFF : 2/1R TAL: 
ONORBIT : 2/ 1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 2/1R AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R 






C [ P I  
LOCATION : 
PART "MBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
PROVIDES AN ERRONEOUS FIRE OUTPUT. FAILURE TO OUTPUT OR THIS 
SAME FAILURE OF THE REDUNDANT SENSOR COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF 
CREW/VEHICLE. IF A FIRE SUPPRESSENT CONTAINER IS DISCHARGED INTO 
THE BAY, APPROXIMATELY 50 HOURS OF FIRE PROTECTION REMAINS. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-53 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/08/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3163 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I FLIGHT: 3/1R ABORT : 3/1R 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE 111) (3) 
FAILURE MODE: INTERMITTENT OPERATION, SHORTED 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) FIRE SUPPRESSION 
3) GROUND CIRCUIT 
4) ARM COMMAND 






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: 3/1R RTLS : 
LIFTOFF: 3/ 1R TAL: 
ONORBIT : 3/ 1R AOA: 
DEORBIT: 3/ 1R ATO: 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P l  
LOCATION: FWD LCA NO. 1, 2, 3 













CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE FAILURE IS ONLY A PROBLEM IF THE PREFLIGHT BUS IS POWERED. 
REFERENCES : 



















,I INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/08/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/1R 
MDAC ID: 3164 ABORT : 2/1R 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) (3) 
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION, SHORTED 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M . J .  SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) FIRE SUPPRESSION 
3) GROUND CIRCUIT 
4) FIRE COMMAND 
5) HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) 
6) 
7 )  
8 )  
9)  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH: 2/ 1R RTLS : 
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 
ONORBIT : 2/1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 2/ 1R AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R 






C [ P I  
LOCATION: FWD LCA NO. 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: 81V76A16, 17, 18 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
PRELAUNCH THE FAILURE PRECLUDES CHARGE UP OF THE FIRE SUPPRESSANT 
PIC SINCE A ONE SECOND TIMEDELAY CANNOT BE ACHIEVED. THEREFORE 
SUPPRESSANT CANNOT BE DISCHARGED INTO THE ASSOCIATED AVIONICS 
BAY. PORTABLE BOTTLES ARE AVAILABLE AS A BACKUP. 
DURING ALL OTHER PHASES, THE INADVERTENT OUTPUT CANNOT EXIST 
WITHOUT A FAILURE THAT POWERS THE PREFLIGHT TEST BUS. THUS, THE 
FLIGHT CIRCUIT IS UNEFFECTED. ALSO ONORBIT THE PORTABLE BOTTLES 
ARE AVAILABLE AS A BACKUP. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-55 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/07/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3165 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 1/ 1 
ABORT: 1/1 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE 11) (3) 
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION, SHORTED 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) FIRE SUPPRESSION 
3) FLIGHT CIRCUIT 
4) FIRE COMMAND 






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F”C ABORT HDW/F”C 
PRELAUNCH: 2/ 1R RTLS : 1/ 1 
LIFTOFF : 1/ 1 
DEORBIT : 1/ 1 
ONORBIT: 2/1R 
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R 
TAL: 1/ 1 
AOA: 1/ 1 
AT0 : 1/ 1 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A ( ] B [  1 C I  3 
LOCATION : FWD LCA NO. 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: 81V76A16, 17, 18 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE FAILURE PRECLUDES CHARGE UP OF THE FIRE SUPPRESSANT PIC SINCE 
THE ONE SECOND TIME DELAY IS BYPASSED. THERFORE, SUPPRESSANT 
CANNOT BE DISCHARGED INTO THE ASSOCIATED AVIONICS BAY DURING LIFT 
OFF OR DEORBIT AND THE PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS 
ARE INACCESSABLE AT THESE TIMES. 
REFERENCES : 







































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3166 
1/ 07/ 8 8 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) - SMOKE DETECTOR GROUND 
RESET 
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION, SHORTED 
LEAD ANALYST: J . D .  ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) FIRE SUPPRESSION 
3) GROUND CIRCUIT 
4) RESET CIRCUIT 
5) HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) 
6) 




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 




AT0 : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 3 B [ P l  C [ P l  
LOCATION : FWD LCA NO. 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: 81V76A16, 17, 18 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE FAILURE ISSUES A CONTINUOUS RESET TO ALL SMOKE DETECTORS 
DISABLING THE STATUS INDICATION FOR THE HARDWARE ALARMS. THE 
CONCENTRATION FDA ALARMS FOR ALL SENSORS ARE UNEFFECTED. 
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE WITH LOSS OF ALL REDUNDANCY. THE 
FAILURE CAN ONLY EXIST WHEN THE PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS IS POWERED. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-57 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/07/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3167 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) - SMOKE DETECTOR GROUND 
RESET 
FAILURE MODE: XDSS OF OUTPUT 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) FIRE SUPPRESSION 
3) GROUND CIRCUIT 
4) RESET CIRCUIT 
5) HYBRID DRIVER (TYPE I) 
6 )  
7) 
8 )  
9)  ' 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3 
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B I  1 C [  1 
LOCATION: FWD LCA NO. 1, 2, 3 
PART NUMBER: 81V76A16, 17, 18 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
SMOKE DETECTORS CANNOT BE RESET BY PRE-FLIGHT TEST BUS CIRCUIT. 
RESET CAN BE PERFORMED USING THE IN FLIGHT CIRCUIT DURING 
PRELAUNCH. DURING THE OTHER PHASES THE CIRCUIT IS INACTIVE BY 
DESIGN. 
REFERENCES : 







































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 2/15/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3168 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/1R 
ABORT: 3/1R 
ITEM: NASA STANDARD INITIATOR 
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION, PREMATURE OPERATION 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) FIRE SUPPRESSION 
3) SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER 
4) NSI 
5 )  
6) 




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT 
PRELAUNCH : 3/1R RTLS : 
LIFTOFF : 3/1R TAL: 
ONORBIT : 3/ 1R AOA: 
DEORBIT : 3/ 1R AT0 : 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R 






c r p 1  
LOCATION : 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, CHEMICAL REACTION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF FIRE SUPPRESSANT WITHIN THE ASSOCIATED AVIONICS BAY. 
AFTER RELEASE, THE BAY IS PROTECTED FOR UP TO 50 HOURS. 
PRELAUNCH THE LAUNCH TOWER EQUIPMENT PROVIDES ONE MORE LEVEL OF 
SAFETY. FOR LIFTOFF THE RELEASE IS A FAIL SAFE CONDITION. FOR 
DEORBIT, IF THE CONTAINER HAS BEEN RELEASED, ONE OF THE PORTABLE 
BOTTLE CAN BE INJECTED INTO THE AFFECTED BAY AND THIS PROVIDES 
APPROXIMATELY 24 HOURS PROTECTION. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-59 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 2/15/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3258 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/F"C 
I FLIGHT: 3/1R ABORT: 3/ 1R 
ITEM: SMOKE DETECTOR (9) 
FAILURE MODE: PARTIAL OUTPUT, LOSS OF CONCENTRATION OUTPUT 
I 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M . J .  SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) SMOKE DETECTION 
3) DETECTOR 
4 )  
5) 
6 )  
7 )  








HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F"C 
3/1R RTLS : 3/ 1R 





AT0 : 3/1R 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ F l  C I P I  
LOCATION : 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF ONE OF FOUR ALARM SOURCES. THE FIRE STATUS OUTPUT OF 
THIS SENSOR PLUS THE FIRE STATUS C CONCENTRATION OUTPUTS OF THE 





















INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 2/15/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 3268 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 1/ 1 
ABORT: 1/ 1 
ITEM: NASA STANDARD INITIATOR 
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO FIRE 
LEAD ANALYST: J.D. ARBET SUBSYS LEAD: M.J. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) FIRE SUPPRESSION 
3) SUPPRESSANT CONTAINER 
4) NSI 
5 )  
6 )  




FLIGHT PHASE HDW,/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH: 3,/ 1R RTLS : 1/ 1 
LIFTOFF : 1,/ 1 TAL: 1/ 1 
ONORBIT : 2,/ 1R AOA: 1/ 1 
DEORBIT : 1,/ 1 AT0 : 1/ 1 
LANDING/SAFING: 2,/1R 





LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO SUPPRESS AN AV BAY FIRE DURING LIFTOFF, 
INCLUDING ABORTS, AND DEORBIT. PORTABLE BOTTLES AVAILABLE IN 





REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-61 
E . 4  





































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/14/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5085 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT : 2/2 
ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY STATUS INDICATOR (2) 
FAILURE MODE: SHORT TO GROUND 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) AIRLOCK 
3) WATER SYSTEM 
4) SUPPLY VALVE 
5) STATUS INDICATOR (DS1, DS3) 
6 )  




FLIGHT PHASE HDWJFUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
PRELAUNCH : 3/ 3 RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
LIFTOFF : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 2/2 
DEORBIT : 3/3 AT0 : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  1 C [  1 
LOCATION: 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
WITH LINE SHORTED TO GROUND, AS THE SWITCH IS MADE, THE BREAKER 
WILL OPEN DUE TO HIGH DEMAND AND THE VALVE WILL NOT ACTUATE. EMU 
SUIT CAN NOT BE SERVICED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-63 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/14/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5086 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 2/2 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER STATUS INDICATOR 
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS TO GROUND 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) AIRLOCX 
3) WATER SYSTEM 
4 )  WASTE VALVE 
5) INDICATOR STATUS (DS2, DS4) 
6) 
7) 
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
AT0 : 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 2/2 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  1 C [  3 
LOCATION: 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
WITH THE LINE SHORTED TO GROUND, AS THE SWITCH IS MADE, THE 
BREAKER WILL OPEN DUE TO HIGH DEMAND, AND THE VALVE WILL NOT 
ACTUATE. EMU SUIT CAN NOT BE SERVICED, THUS LOSS OF MISSION. 
REFERENCES : 







































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/14/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5087 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 2/2 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: EMU WATER SUPPLY LINES & FITTINGS 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) AIRLOCR 
3) WATER SYSTEM 
4 )  
5 )  
6) 




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/F"C 






ONORBIT : 2J2 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3,/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C  1 C C  1 
LOCATION : 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, 
VI BRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO SERVICE THE EMU'S. TWO 
CREWMEN ARE ASSUMED TO BE SUITED (BASELINE) AND NEITHER HAS A 
SPARE scu. 
kEFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-65 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/14/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/2 
MDAC ID: 5088 ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: LCG SUPPLY 61 RETURN, LINES SI FITTINGS 
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) AIRLOCK 
3) WATER SYSTEM 
4) 
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8) 







HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/F"C 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 






REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  1 C [  1 
LOCATION : 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, 
VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM FUNCTION. ASSUMING A 
TWO MAN CREW (BASELINE MISSION), RECOVERY CAN NOT BE PERFORMED 
SINCE EACH SCU CONNECTION HAS NO REDUNDANCY AND SHATLING ONE SCU 
WOULD BE CREW ACTION WHICH IS AGAINST SPEC. NSTS 22206. 
REFERENCES : 




















INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/14/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5089 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 2/2 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: LCG SUPPLY & RETURN, LINES & FITTINGS 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) AIRLOCK 
3) WATER SYSTEM 
4) 
5 )  
6) 
7) 
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 




ONORBIT : 2/2 AOA: 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 ATO: 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 





LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO PERFORM FUNCTION. ASSUMING A 
TWO MAN CREW (BASELINE MISSION), RECOVERY CAN NOT BE PERFORMED 
SINCE EACH SCU CONNECTION HAS NO REDUNDANCY AND SHATLING ONE SCU 
WOULD BE CREW ACTION WHICH IS AGAINST SPEC. NSTS 22206. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-67 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/14/88 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT FLIGHT: 2/2 
MDAC ID: 5090 ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: EMU WASTE WATER LINE h FITTINGS 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) AIRLOCK 
3 )  WATER SYSTEM 
4 )  
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8 )  


























LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY TO SERVICE THE EMU'S. A TWO MAN 
CREW (BASELINE MISSION) IS ASSUMED TO BE SUITED AND NEITHER HAS A 
SPARE scu. 
REFERENCES: 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-68 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/14/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5091 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
3/3 ABORT: 
ITEM: 02 QUICK COUPLINGS (NOT USED FOR SCU) AND CAP 
FAILURE MODE: INABILITY TO CLOSE, INTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 




5 )  
6) 




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
AT0 : 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 B [  1 c c  1 
LOCATION : 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE COUPLINGS ARE NOT USED ANY TIME DURING THE MISSION. THERE 
ARE HARDWARE ITEMS TO PREVENT LEAKS ON THIS VALVE, COUPLING AND 
CAP. FUNCTIONALLY THIS FAILURE IS NOT IMPORTANT SINCE BY 
DEFINITION THIS LEAK IS "INTERNAL". THUS THE CREW IS NOT EVEN 
AWARE OF THE FAILURE, I.E.: BY DEFINITION "INTERNAL LEAK" MEANS 
NOT ALL THE SEALS CAN FAIL (THIS WOULD BE EXTERNAL LEAKAGE). 
INABILITY TO CLOSE IS MOOT SINCE THE CAP WOULD NEVER BE TAKEN OFF 
DURING FLIGHT (CREW USES THE SCU) . 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-69 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : i/ 141 a a 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5092 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I FLIGHT: /NA ABORT: /NA 
ITEM: 02 QUICK COUPLING AND CAP (NOT USED FOR SCU) 
FAILURE MODE: INABILITY TO OPEN 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M. SAIIDI 
I BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 




5 )  










HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : /NA 







AT0 : /NA 





THIS FAILURE IS MOOT SINCE THE COUPLINGS ARE NEVER USED DURING 
FLIGHT. 
REFERENCES : 


































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/14/88 
MDAC ID: 5093 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 3/3 
ABORT : 3/3 
ITEM: CAP VENT DEBRIS SCREEN 
FAILURE MODE: DAMAGED ELEMENT, OPEN 
LEAD ANALYST: Re DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: Me SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) AIRLOCK 
3) DEPRESS SYSTEM 
4) 
5) 
6 )  
7) 
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 




AT0 : 3/3 
ONORBIT : 3/3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [  1 C [  1 
LOCATION : 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, CHEMICAL REACTION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, 
MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THIS FAILURE MODE IS QUESTIONABLE. HOWEVER, NO MISSION IMPACT. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-71 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/14/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5094 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I FLIGHT: /NA ABORT : /NA 
ITEM: AIRLOCK TO AMBIENT CAP 
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAK 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2 )  AIRLOCK 
3 )  
4) 
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8) 







HDW/F"C ABORT HDW/F"C 




/NA AOA: /NA 
/NA 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 
AT0 : /NA 





FAILURE IS NOT REALISTIC SINCE THE CAP NOMINALLY WOULD NOT BE 
REMOVED DURING MISSION. 
REFERENCES : 


































INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : i/ 14\88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5095 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 2/2 
ABORT: 2/2 
ITEM: VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE (1) 
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) AIRLOCK 
3) VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE 
4) 
5 )  
6) 
7 )  
8 )  
9) 
CRITICALITIES 
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC 




AT0 : 2/2 
ONORBIT : 2/2 
DEORBIT: 2/2 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [  1 c c  1 
LOCATION: 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE FAILURE IS QUESTIONABLE. PER NSTS 22206 THE LEAK CAN NOT BE 
THROUGH THE PACKING IN THE VALVES PENETRATION. THE ONLY OTHER 
PLACES COULD BE THE CASING ITSELF WHICH IS UNREALISTIC OR THE 0- 
RING WHICH SEALS THE VALVE TO THE BULKHEAD. THE O-RING (LACK 
OF) IS NOT BIG ENOUGH TO DRAIN THE CABIN FASTER THAN CONSUMMABLES 
FLOW. HOWEVER, ASSUMING CREW INABILITY TI CORRECT THE FAILURE 
LEADS TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF AN IMMEDIATE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO AN 
UNCONTROLLABLE LEAK. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-73 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 1/14/88 
MDAC ID: 5096 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
I FLIGHT: 2/1R ABORT : 2/1R 
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS, 2 INCH DEPRESSURIZATION 
FAILURE MODE: EXTERNAL LEAKAGE 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) AIRLOCK 













HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F"C 
RTLS : 2/1R 
TAL : 2/ 1R 2/ 1R 




AT0 : 2/lR 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P l  C I P I  
LOCATION: 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE LEAK CAN BE CONTROLLED WITH THE VACUUM VENT ISOLATION VALVE. 
LOSS OF FUNCTION CREATES A LEAK IN THE CABIN WITH THE POTENTIAL 
LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE. EVEN THOUGH THE VACUUM ISOLATION VALVE HAS 
A GAS DRAIN ORIFICE, THERE IS A POTENTIAL BUILD UP OF H2 
IF THE LEAK IS DOWNSTREAM OF THIS INTERFACE, WHICH ALSO HAS THE 
POTENTIAL FOR LOSS OF LIFE/VEHICLE IF H2 IGNITES. THUS, MISSION 
IS TERMINATED ON FIRST FAILURE. 
REFERENCES : 
















INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 


















DATE : 1/14/88 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5097 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: /NA 
ABORT: /NA 
ITEM: LINES & FITTINGS, 2 INCH DEPRESSURIZATION 
FAILURE MODE: RESTRICTED FLOW 
LEAD ANALYST: R. DUFFY SUBSYS LEAD: M. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT 
2) AIRLOCK 
3) VACUUM VENT 
4 )  
5 )  
6 )  
7 )  
8) 
9 )  
CRITICALITIES 







ONORBIT : /NA 
DEORBIT : /NA 
LANDING/SAFING: /NA 





NO CRITICALITY HAS BEEN ASSIGNED BECAUSE THIS FAILURE IS NOT 
CREDIBLE. THE LINE IS 2 INCHES IN DIAMETER AND WOULD REQUIRE 
LARGE SIZE DEBRIS FOR EFFECTIVE PLUGGING. ON THE OTHER HAND, 
HYDROGEN IS A VERY LIGHT MOLECULE AND CAN PERMEATE THROUGH ANY 
SIZE CRACK. IF IOA HAD TO ASSIGNED A CRITICALITY, IT WOULD BE A 
2/2 (LOSS OF MISSION) SINCE THE AIRLOCK WOULD BE UNABLE TO 
DEPRESSURIZE. 
REFERENCES : 
REPORT DATE 03/10/88 E-75 
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT 
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
DATE : 
SUBSYSTEM: LIFE SUPPORT 
MDAC ID: 5098 
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC 
FLIGHT: 2/2 
ABORT: 3/3 
ITEM: AIRLOCK DEPRESSURIZATION CAP 
FAILURE MODE: INABILITY TO REMOVE 
LEAD ANALYST: K. BARICKMAN SUBSYS LEAD: M. SAIIDI 
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: 
1) LIFE SUPPORT SYSTEM 
2) AIRLOCK 
3) DEPRESS SYSTEM 
4 )  
5) 
6) 




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/F”C ABORT HDW/FUNC 
RTLS : 3/3 
TAL: 3/3 
AOA: 3/3 
AT0 : 3/3 
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 
LIFTOFF: 3/3 
ONORBIT: 3/ 3 
DEORBIT : 3/3 
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [  1 C I  1 
LOCATION : 
PART NUMBER: 
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING/ABUSE 
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: 
THE FAILURE TO REMOVE THE CAP CREATES LOSS OF THE VALVE FUNCTION 
AND POTENTIALLY LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF EVA CAPABILITY. 
REFERENCES : 








































NASA FMEA TO IOA WORKSHEET CROSS REFERENCE/RECOMMENIONS 
This section provides a cross reference between the NASA F'MEA and 
corresponding IOA analysis worksheet(s) included in Appendix E. 
The Appendix F identifies: NASA FMEA Number, IOA Assessment 
Number, NASA criticality and redundancy screen data, and IOA 
recommendations. 





































ORffilML PASE 1s 
8 f :  WOR QUALITY 
.................................................................................................................. 
I I 1  I  NASk 1 1  I  I D A  RECUHtlENDITIONS * I DENTIF IERS I 
I------------------------------------------I !------------------I I------------------------------------------------I 
I NASA I I OA I: C R I T  I SCREENS II C R I T  I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE I 
:=l=========DL=====D==I==.================I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
I LS-5082 I: I : I I  313 I I : x :  
I :I I I I: 313 I I : X I  I LS-5083 
I 01-1-1602-2 I LS-5038 II 3/1R I P P P :I 313 I I : X I  
I LS-3144X I: 3I1R I P P P II I I I 05-06-2026-3 
I LS-3012 I: 3/1R I P F P I: I I I 05-06-2027-3 
I 05-06-2204-2 I LS-3163X I: 3IlR I P NII P I !  1 I 
I 05-06-2254-2 I LS-3052 I :  111 I II 1 I 
I 05-06-2254-3 I LS-3053 I: 311R t P N P I1 313 I I t i l  
I LS-3049 I I  313 I II I I 
I 05-6UA-2000-1 I LS-5009 II 311R : P NA P I: 212 I I : x :  
I 05-06-2310-1 
I 05-bUA-2000-2 I LS-5010 : I  2 3  I 31; ; I 
I 05-bUI-2001-1 : LS-5017 I I  3ZR I P NA P I i  212 I I I X i  
I 05-6118-2001-2 I Ls-zoia I I  313 : I I 313 I 
I I  313 ; I 0 5 - ~ ~ ~ - ~ 0 0 5 - 1  I LS-5008 b I > / &  I 
I I LS-50lb I: 313 I II 3 3  I I I I 
I 05-6UA-2008-1 I LS-5006 I I  3 i lR  I P MA P I: 212 I I : X I  
I! 311R I P NA P I I  2/2 ! I t x :  
I 05-6UA-2008-2 I LS-5006A I: 311R I P N P II 2 i 2  I I : X I  
I i LS-5055R :I 3 l lR  I P NB P I: 212 I I ; X I  
I 05-6UA-2009-1 I LS-5014 It 311R I P MA P I I  212 I I : X I  
I 05-6UA-2009-2 I LS-5014A I :  312R I P HA P I :  212 I I : X I  
I 05-6UA-2012-1 I LS-5085X I I  S I l R  I P HA P I: 212 I I i x :  
I IS-5007 I :  3/3 I I :  3/3 I 
I 05-bUA-2013-1 I LS-50861 I I  311R I P NA P I :  212 I I : X I  
I 05-6U8-2012-2 
! LS-5015 I: 313 1 ; I  513 ; I I I I 05-6UA-2013-2 
I LS-5023 i: 3 i3  I I I 313 I I 05-MA-2016-1 I I I 
I 05-6UA-2017-1 I is-5001 I I  Si3 I II 313 I 
I 05-bV-2000-1 I LS-3001 I: 2 I l R I P  P P I ;  2 1 1 R I P  i P 1 ! X I  
I : I  211R I P P P I I  2/1R I P F P ; I X I  I LS-3003 
I LS-3005 : I  211R I P P P :I 2I lR I P F P I ! A I  
i 05-bW-2900-2 ; LS-SO02 :: 313 ; I :  I I 
1 I LS-3004 I I 313 i I 1  1 I I I I 
I I is-3006 I: 313 I I :  1 I I i I 
I 05-bV-2001-2 I LS-3007 :I 111 I II / I 
05-6V-2001-3 I LS-3008 I :  3/3 : I ,  I I I $ I 
I 05-bV-2026-4 I LS-344 I: 111 ; II 1 I 
i 05-bV-2027-1 I LS-3011 ; I  31lR I P P P I I  1 I 
I 05-bV-2027-4 I L:-3112% II 111 I I 1  I I I I I 
I 05-OV-2028-3 I LS-31481 I :  311R I P NII P II 211R I P P P I t :t I 
I 05-6v-2028-4 I LS-3048 I: 111 I II i I I I I 
I LS-3013 I: 3/3 I It I I I 05-6V-2024-1 I I I 
I LS-301% :: 3 3  I I 1  i I I 05-6V-2029-2 
I 05-bV-2029-3 I LS-3014 II 311R I P P P II I I 
I LS-31141 I I  311R I P P P ! I  I I I 05-bV-2029-4 
I 05-6V-2071-1 ; LS-3045 3/3 I I: i ; 
I 05-6V-2072-1 I LS-3047 I 1  313 I I !  ! I I I I 
I 05-6V-2073-1 I LS-3055 I: 2 i lR  : P N P I I  3 l l R  I P P P I 1 1 :  
I 05-6V-2074-1 ; LS-3026 II 313 I II f : 
I I LS-303 I I 313 I I I  i I I I I 
I 05-bV-2075-1 i Ls-zoa :I 315 1 I I  ! I f I I 
I 
I FWEA NUHBER I ASSESSHENT NUHBER I :  H#/F I A E C I: HWlF I A B C I (SEE LEGEND CODE) I I 
I I 
I 
I I I  I I 
I I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
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ORDCllNAL PAGE IS 
W POOR QUALfTY 
I 
1 I DENT IFIERS I 1  NASA I 1  I D A  RECOHHENDATIUNS + 
)------------------------------------------I )------------------I I------------------------------------------------~ 
I NASA I I OA II C R I T  I SCREENS I: C R I T  I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE I 
I FHEA NUHEER I ASSESSHENT NUflBER II HWIF I A B C I1 HY/F I A B C I (SEE LEGEND CODE) I 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I=f===ltf==f3=D===~===l~=.==11======11==f====^L=: 
I 05-6VC-2021-1 I LS-2154 It 312R I P P P II 312R I P NA P I I X I  
I 05-6VC-2021-2 f LS-2154 II 312R I P NA P II 312R I P NA P I 
I I LS-2155 If 31ZR I P NA P :I 312R f P NA P I 
I LS-2154A I I 312R I P NA P II 312R I P N I  P I I 05-bVC-2021-3 
I I 15-21558 I I  312R I P NA P I: 312R I P NA P I I 
I 05-6VC-2022-1 I LS-2173 I: 212 I I I  212 I 
I I LS-2174 I I  212 I I f  212 I I I I 
I I LS-2175 I I  212 I I: 2/2 I I I 
I 05-6VC-2022-2 I LS-2173 I I  3/2R I P NA P I: 312R I P NA P I I 1 
I I LS-2174A II 312R I P NA P !I 312R I P NR P I I I 
I I LS-2175A I I 312R I P NA P II 312R I P NA P i I I 
I 05-6VC-2023-1 I LS-2195 :I 211R f P NA P I I  2/1R I P NA is I I I 
I t LS-2196 I: 21lR I P MA P I I  2I lR I P NA P I I I 
I I LS-2197 I :  2 1 1 ~  I r NI P I: 2/iR I P NA P ; I I 
I I LS-2198 I: 211R I P NA P I: 211R I P NA P I I 
I I LS-2199 II 211R I P NA P :I 2/iR I P NA P I I 
I I LS-2201 II 2 i l R  I P #A P :I 211R I P NA P I I I 
I 05-6VC-2023-2 I LS-219% I: 3 l lR  I P NA P II 31lR I P NA P I 
I I LS-2196A I I  311R I P NA P I I  311R I P NA P I I I 
I I LS-21974 I: 3I1R I P HA P I: 311R I P NR P I I I 
I I LS-21984 II 3 l R  I P HA P I: 311R I P NA P I I I 
I I LS-2199A I: 31lR I P NA P II 3/lR I P NA i? I I I 
I I LS-2201G I I  311R I P NA P I: 311R I P NA P I I 1 
I 05-bVC-2024-1 I LS-2191 I: 211R I P P P :I 31lR I P NR P I I X :  
I I LS-2192 II Z l l R  I P P P I I  311R I P MA P I 1 1 1  
I It 211R I P P P II 311R I P NA P I : X I  
I I  312R I P NA P I : X I  
I l a :  
I 05-bVC-2024-2 I LS-2191A If 3 i 3  I 
i 05-bVC-2025-1 I LS-2220 I I  313 I : I  111 I 
I 05-6VC-2025-2 I LS-2220A :I 313 I I: 111 I I ; X I  
I 05-6VC-2026-1 I LS-5047 I: 21lR I P P P I I  I I I i l l  
I LS-5068 I :  ZIIR I r r r : I  I i I I X 1  
05-bVC-2026-2 I L S - ~ O ~  I: 2/1R I P P P I: i I : 1 ;  
I 05-6VC-2027-1 I LS-50bJ :I 211R I P NA P I! / I : X I  
I 05-bVC-2027-2 : LS-5070 : I  3 l l R  I P NA P : I  311R I P NA P I I I 
I 05-bVC-2030-1 I LS-5074 I: 313 I f I 3 i 3  I 
I 05-6VC-2030-2 I LS-5075 : I  313 I I I  313 I 
I 05-6VC-2031-1 I LS-2202 I: 313 I I I  31; I 
I 05-6VC-2031-2 I LS-2202A I: 313 : II 312R I P NII P I I X I  
I 05-6°C-2032-1 I LS-5073 I I  Si3 I I :  3 3  I 
I LS-507% :I 313 I I: 313 I I 05-6VC-2032-2 
I is-5077 I I  313 I : I  313 I I 05-bVC-2033-1 
I I LS-5078 ! I  313 I I 1  JId I I I 
I 05-6VC-2033-2 I LS-5077R I I  3 i 3  I I; 313 I ! 
I I LS-507RG I I  313 : II 313 I I 
313 I I 05-bVC-2034-1 I LS-2166 I I 313 I I 1  I I 
I I LS-2167 I I  313 I I I . d J  I I I i 
I I LS-2168 t :  313 I I :  313 I , I I 
I 05-bVC-2035-1 f LS-2157 It 313 I If  313 I 
I I LS-2158 :I 313 I I: 31; I I I 
II 313 I I I  J/J I I LS-2159 I I I 
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I I DENT IF I ERS I I  NASA I I  I D A  RECOY~ENDATIONS * 
(------------------------------------------Ii------------------' II 1-,----------,-----------------------------------~ 
I MASA I IDA I I  CRIT I SCREENS :I CRIT I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE : 
I FHEA NUHBER I ASSESSRENT NUHBER : I  HWiF I R B C I t  HWIF I R B C I (SEE LEGEND CODE) I 
:======================:====================I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I==.==01I:========3;========5=============I=======I 
I LS-1114 I f  3llR I P P P ! I  i I : X I  
I l l  
I 05-6VD-2031-1 
I LS-1115 I: 3llR I P P P :I i I 
II 311R I P NR P I I  I I 1 : X I  I 05-6VD-2031-2 I LS-1116 
I I X I  ! I  3llR I P P P II I I 
I I X I  
I 65-6VD-2032-1 : LS-1258% 
I LS-1259% II 31lR I P P P I I  i I 
! D5-6VD-2032-2 I LS-126OX I !  3ilR I P NA P I: i I I I X I  
I 05-6VD-2033-1 I LS-1183 I I  312R I P P P I I  I I 
I LS-1185 ; I  312R I P P P I :  i I I I I 
I 05-6VD-2033-2 I LS-1183A I :  311R I P NR P I I  / I I I X I  
I LS-1184 I I  311R I P NA P I :  i I I I X I  
: 05-6VD-2036-1 I LS-1175 I t  3ilR I P P P I :  / I I I X I  
I 05-iVD-2036-2 I LS-il75A I I  313 I I :  i I 
I 05-6VD-2037-1 1 LS-it60 I !  3llR I P P P : I  / I I .t I 
: 05-OW-2037-2 I LS-116QA II 313 I I I  i I I 1 .\ I 
I 05-bVD-2038-1 I LS-1217 II 3i1R I P NA P II i I : X I  
I 05-6VD-2038-2 I LS-1217A I :  3/3 I I 1  I I I I 
I 05-6VD-2039-1 I LS-1117 I: 311R I P P P II i I : x i  
I 05-bVD-2039-2 I LS-1117A : I  313 I I I  i I 
I 05-6VD-2040-1 I LS-1117B I I  ZilR I P P P I t  i I : X I  
I 05-6VD-2040-2 I LS-1117c : I  313 I I :  i I 
I 05-6VD-2041-1 I LS-1199 I :  3ilR I P P P I I  i i I : x :  
I LS-1199A I ;  3 3  I I: i I I I I I 05-6VD-2041-2 
I 05-6VD-2042-1 I LS-1186 I :  311R I P P P I I  I I : X I  
I 05-6VD-2042-2 I LS-11B6A I I  313 I I: I I 
I 05-bVD-2044-1 I LS-1118 :I 513 I I I  i I 
I I I  3/3 I I: i I I 1 I I I IS-il62 
I I LS-117b 1 1  3 iJ  I I: i I I I I 
I I I  i 3 I I LS-il8B I I  313 I f I 
I I is-1201 I f  313 I I I  i I 1 
I LS-i218 I; j/z I I )  I I I I I 
I 05-bVD-2048-1 I LS-1119 I; 3,s :  ; I 1  i I I 
1 i 15-1161 1 :  313 1 I I  / I I I 
1 I LS-1177 II 3 i 3  I I: i I I I 
I I ~s-1187 I :  313 I I I  / : I I 
I I LS-1200 1 :  313 I II i I I I I 
1 i I  313 I I :  / I I I 0
I 06-1-1104-1 I LS-5044 :: 3i2R I P P P I I  Zi3  I I : x i  
; 06-1-lil4-1 I LS-504SA I: 3/2R I P P P I I  31'3 I I ! X I  
I 06-1-1120-1 I LS-5053 II 3/2R I P P P I f  ;I; i t x :  
I 06-1-1120-4 I LS-5054 I I  212 I I :  32R I P P P I I % :  
i 06-1-1121-1 I LS-5053A :I 3/3 ; I :  313 I 
I Ob-1-1121-4 I LS-50546 I I  212 I I :  312R I P P P I I : :  
t 06-1-1122-1 I LS-5050 I I  311R I P P P f I  3/2R I P P P I ; x i  
96-1-1122-2 I LS-5051 : I  211R : P NA P 1 :  212 I I X I  
I 06-1-1122-4 I LS-5052 II lil I II 2 2  I I : x i  
I 06-1-1125-1 I LS-5048 I I  7 1 R  I P P P :: 3/2R I P P P I I x I 
1' 06-1-1123-2 I LS-5049 I :  ZllR I P P P I :  3 3  I : X I  
I 95-1-1124-1 LS-5047 II 211R I P P P : 1  3 3  I ; I :  
I 06-1-1124-2 I LS-5046 I :  3i1R I P P P I :  3iZR I P P P I : x :  
I 06-1-1124-3 : LS-5094X i I  211R P F P I !  I N A  I I : X I  
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F-7 
ORIGINAL PAGE IS 



















O m i f f w .  "&.%E r3 
of POOR QGALiTpl ................................................................................................................. 
I 
I 
I t  1 NASA I t  1  I OA RECOMMENDAT I ONS * I DENTIF I ERS I 
:------------------------------------------I I 1  '------------------I I--- --------------------------------------------I 
I NASA I I O A  II CRIT  I SCREENS I I  C R I T  I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE I 
I FHEA NUn8ER I ASSESSHENT NUMBER II HW/F I A B C II HW/F I A 8 C I (SEE LEGEND CODE) I 
......................................................... I=======I.=======.=t=====================I=======I 
I LS-2039 I: 3/2R I P NA P II 3/2R I P NA P I I I I 06-2-0101-1 
I : LS-2069 ! I  3/2R I P NA P II 3/2R I P NA P 1 I I 
I LS-22251 I I  312R ! P NA P II 3/2R I P HA P I I 06-2-0102-1 
I 06-2-0105-1 I LS-2004 II 3lZR I P MA P I I 3/2R I P NA P I 
I LS-2005 I: 3/2R I P NA P ! I  3/2R I P NA P I I I I 06-2-0105-2 
I 06-2-0109-1 i LS-2013 II 3/2R I P NA P I I  3/2R t P NA P I 
I 06-2-0109-2 I LS-2009 It 3/2R I P NA P II 3/2R I P HA P I 
I I LS-2010 II 3/2R I P NR P II 3/2R I P NA P I I I 
I Ob-2-0109-3 I LS-20088 I !  3/2R I P #A P II 3/2R I P NA P I 
I i LS-2010A I I  312R I P NA P I I  3/2R I P NA P I I I 
I 06-2-0109-4 1 LS-2001 II 3/2R I P NG P I I  3/2R I P HA P I 
I I LS-2003 I: 3 Z R  I P NA P I t  3/2R I P NA P I I I 
I I LS-2006 I: 3/2R I P NA P I I 3/2R I P NA P I I I 
I I LS-2009 I f  3/2R 1 P Nb P II 312R I P NA P I I I 
I I LS-2011 :I 3/2R I P NA P II 3/2R I P NA P I I I 
I Ob-2-0110-1 I LS-2063 II 3i2R I P NA P :I 3/2R I P NA P I 
I I LS-2102 :I 3/2R I P NA P I: 3/2R I P NA P I I I 
I I LS-2107 II 3/2R I P NA P II 3/2R I P NA P I I I 
I I Ls-zioa I: 3i2R I P NA P I I  3/2R I P NA P : 1 I 
I 06-2-01 10-2 I LS-2061 I I  3iZR I P NA P I t  3 2 R  I P NA P I 
I I LS-2062 I: 3/2R I P NA P II 3/2R I P NL P I I I 
I It 3/2R I P NA P I: 3/2R I P NA P I I  I  I LS-2063A 
II 312R I P NL P I: 3/2R I P NA P I I LS-21074 
II M R  I P NA P II 312R I P NA P I I LS-21086 I I 
I 06-2-0110-3 I LS-206211 II 3/2R I P NA P I I  3/2R I P NA P I 
I I LS-20638 I I  32R t P NA P II 3/2R I P NA P I I I 
I I LS-210% :i 312R I P NA P I I  3/2R I P Nk P I I 
I I LS-2107B I I  3lZR I P NA P II 312R i P NA P I I I 
I :I 3/2R I P NA P I t  3/2R I P #A P I I I 1 I LS-ilO8B 
I 06-2-01 10-4 I LS-2062B I I  S I Z R  I P NA P I: 3/2R I P NA P I 
1 : LS-2063C II 2/2R i P N I  P :I 3/2R I P NA P : t L 
I I LS-21028 II 312R I P 111 P I: X ' R  I P NA P I I I 
I I LS-21OiC II 3 2 R  I P NA P I: 3/2R I P NA P I I 
I I is-2108C I I  312R I P NA P I! 3/2R I P MA P I I I 
I 06-2-0115-1 I LS-2239x It ;/2R I P NA P II 3/2R ! P NA P 1 I I 
I 06-2-01 15-2 
I 06-2-0116-1 1 LS-2002 I I  3 3  I II 3/2R I P NA P : I X I  
I 06-2-0116-2 I LS-2002A II 313 I It 3/2R I P HA P I l x :  
i 06-2-0117-1 I LS-2011 I: 3i2R 1 P NA P It 3/2R I P HA P I 
I I LS-2093 II 3/2R 1 P NA P I I  3/2R I P NA P I I I 
I I LS-2094 I: 3/2R I P NA P I I 3/2R I P NA P I I I 
I I LS-2096 I I  3/2R I P NA P I: 3/2R I P NA P .I I I 
I 06-2-0117-2 I LS-2092 :I 313 I I: 3/2R I P NA P I I X I  
I I LS-2095 It 313 1 I t  3/2R I P NA P I : X I  
1 06-2-01 18-1 I LS-2097 I: XR I P Na P I :  XR I P HA P I 
: 06-2-0118-2 I ~s-2098 It 313 I I I  3:2R I P Nil P I : x :  
I 06-2-0119-1 I L3-2077 I: 5/2R I P MA P I I  3/2R I P NA P I 
I IS-2079 t I  312R I P NL P If 3/2R I P NA P I I I 
I Ob-2-0119-2 I LS-2077G II 3/3 I !I 3/2R I P NA P I I X I  
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F-9 
ORfG1NAL PAGE IS 
OF rOOR QUALITY 
.................................................................................................................. 
I 
I I I  1 NASA I f  1  IDA  RECOHHENDATIDNS * I IDENTIF IERS 
!______ ----------------------------I l_________-_-_____-I I------------------------------------------------~ 
NASA I I D A  II CRIT  I SCREENS I I CRIT  I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE I 
I FHEA NUHBER I ASSESSRENT NUHBER :I HR/F I A B C : I  H W F  I A B C I (SEE LEGEND CODE) I 
1----------------------1-------------------1 - - - - 1 - ---------1 I------------------I l- - - - - - -ll- - -l----------~---------------------~-------~ I-------l----------I---------------------l-------l 
I 06-2-01 19-4 I LS-2241X I :  313 I II 3/3 I 
I 06-2-0201-1 I LS-2081 :I 3 / 3  I I :  3 3  I 
I 06-2-0201-2 I LS-2079 I: 5/3 I :I 313 I 
I I LS-2080 I: 3 3  I :I 3/2R I P NA P ! 
I 




I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
I I I 
I ! X I  
I LS-2020 I: 3 / 2 R  I P NA P II 3 / 2 R  I P NA P I I I I 06-2-0202-1 
I 06-2-0202-2 I LS-2019 I I  3 / 1 R  : P N4  P I: 3/1R I P MA P I 
: 06-2-0202-3 I LS-201911 :I 3/lR : P NA P I: 3/1R I P NA P I 
I 06-2-0203-1 
I 












I LS-2016 I :  3/lR I P NA P :I 3 / l R  I P NA P I I I 
I I LS-2022 II 3 / 1 R  I P MA P : I  31lR : P NA P I 
I I LS-2024 : I  311R I P NA P I I  3 / 1 R  I P NA P I I I 
i 06-2-0206-2 I LS-2017 :: 212 I II 2/2 I 
I : Ls-2018 ;I 2/2 I II 2 f 2  I I I I 
I 06-2-0207-1 I LS-2090 I :  3 3  I I: 312 I 
I 
I 06-2-0203-2 I LS-2227X II Y 2 R  I P #A P I: 3 f 2 R  I P NA P I 
II 3/2R I P N4 P I t  3 / 2 R  I P NA P I I 06-2-0206-1 : LS-2228X 
I I 





I I I 06-2-0208-1 I LS-2049 :I 3 / 2 R  I P NA P : I  3?2R I P NA P I 
I 06-2-0208-2 : LS-2050 : I  3/lR I P HA P I :  ZilR : P HA P I I I 
I G6-2-0208-3 I LS-2049A I: 312R I ? NA P I :  3/2R I P Plk P I 





I I I 
I I LS-2051 II 3 / 1 R  I P NII P I !  3 l R  I P NA P I I I 
I 06-2-0209-1 I LS-2053 I :  3/3  I I I 3 / 2 R  I P NA P I : X I  
I 06-2-0209-3 I LS-2053A II 3 f 3  I I: 3 / 2 R  I P NA P I : x :  
I I LS-2054 I I  3/; I :I 3 / 2 R  I P MA P I ' : X I  
I 06-2-0209-4 I LS-2052A I :  312R I P P P I: 3 / 2 R  I P MA P I I X I  
I Ob-2-021s-1 I LS-2056 I :  3;; I f :  313 I 
I LS-2055 II 3 / 2 R  I P #A P II 3 / 2 R  I P NA P I I I 
I LS-205bii I I 3: I II 313 I 
I I LS-2057 II 313 I :I 313 I I I I 
06-2-0213-4 I LS-205% I :  3 1 3  i P NA P : I  3 i 2 R  I P MA P I 
I 06-2-0214-1 I LS-2058 I :  3i2R I P NA P I: 312R I P NA P I 
I I LS-2059 I I  31ZR I P NA P I1 312R I P NA P I I 1 
I LS-2058A I I  3 / 2 R  I P NA P It 312R I P NA P t I I I 06-2-0214-3 
I: 313 I ; I  313 I I 06-2-0214-4 I LS-2060 I I I 
I 06-2-0215-1 I LS-2067 I: 3 / 2 R  I P NA P II 3/2R I P MA P I 
I I LS-2253x I :  3/2R I P NA P I: 32R I P NA P I I I 
I 06-2-021b-1 i LS-2045 I: 3 / 2 R  ! P HA P :I 3iZR I P NA P I 
I 06-2-0216-2 I LS-2045A I: 3 l R  I P NR P II 31R I P NA P I 
: 06-2-0216-3 I LS-2045B I: 3/3 I I: 3 / 2 R  I P NA P I : x :  
I 06-2-0216-4 I IS-2045c II 3/3 I II 3/?R I P NA P I : X I  
: 06-2-0216-6 I LS-2045E I :  313 I !I 3/2R P NA P : : X I  
I I  313 I I: 513 I I LS-225OX I I I 
I LS-2231X :I ;/3 I I I  /NA I I I X I  
.t Ob-2-0209-2 I LS-2052 I :  312R I P NA P II 3 / 2 R  I P NA P I I I  
, 
LS-2234X I: 3 / 2 R  I P P P I :  3 / 2 R  I P P P I I I I 06-2-0210-1 I 
I 06-2-0211-2 I LS-2076 I: 3 2 R  I P P P II 3 / 2 R  I P NA P I 
I 06-2-0213-2 
I I I 
I I I 
I I 
, I I  I 
I I , 
I I 
I I 
I I  
I I 
I 











I 06-2-0216-5 I LS-2045D I :  3/2R I P NA P I :  3/2R I P NA P I I I 
I 06-2-0216-7 I LS-2015F I I  312R I P NA P I i  3/33 I P HA P I 
I 06-2-0217-1 
; 06-2-0218-2 I LS-2026 II 3/2R I P HA P I: 3 i 2 R  I P NA P I 
I 06-2-0217-1 I LS-2028 I I  3 C R  I P MA P II 3 / 2 R  I P NG P I 
I 26-2-0219-2 I LS-2021 I I  Y 2 R  I P NA P I I  312R I P NA P I 
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I 
I I DENT IFIERS 1 1  NASA I I  I O A  RECOMHENDATIONS * I 
)------------------------------------------I II '------------------I I------------------------------------------------~ 
I NASA I I OA I: CRIT I SCREENS I t  CRIT I SCREENS I OTHER I ISSUE I 
I FHEA NUHBER I ASSESSHENT NUHBER It HW/F I A B C II HW/F I A B C I (SEE LEGEND CODE; I 
............................................ .................... t===r=L./==0======rl=0=.======t==============I=======I 
I 06-2-0220-1 I LS-22231 It 313 I II 313 I 
I 06-2-0221-1 I LS-2254x II 3/2R I P P P I :  3/2R I P HA P I I X I  
I 06-2-0221-2 t LS-224ox :I 313 I I I  3/3 I 
I 06-2-0302-1 I LS-2072 I: 312R I P NA P I: 3/2R I P NA P I 
I LS-2070 II 312RIP F P I !  3 / 2 R I P  F P I I I I 06-2-0302-2 
I 06-2-0311-1 I LS-2118 II 312R I P NA P I I  3/2R I P NA P I 
I LS-2117 I I  312R I P NR P !I 3/2R I P NA P I I 06-2-0311-2 
I 06-2-0311-3 i LS-2116 :I 2/2 I I I 212 I 
I 06-2-0312-1 I LS-2121 II 3/2R I P NA P :I 3/2R I P NA P I 
I LS-2120 I I  X l R  I P P P I I  Y l R  I P P P I I I t 36-2-0312-3 
I I LS-2125 I I  3/lR I P P P I I  3/1R I P P P I I , 1
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